Do Better-Performing Nongovernmental Organizations Report More Accurately? Evidence from Financial Accounts in Uganda by Burger, Ronelle et al.
Better performing NGOs do report more accurately?  
Evidence from investigating Ugandan NGO financial accounts* 
Dr Ronelle Burger  
University of Stellenbosch, South Africa 
Canh Thien Dang  
University of Nottingham, United Kingdom 
Dr Trudy Owens 
University of Nottingham, United Kingdom 
Corresponding author: 
Dr Trudy Owens 
School of Economics, Sir Clive Granger Building, The University of Nottingham 
University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, U.K. 
Email: trudy.owens@nottingham.ac.uk  
Tel: +44 (0)115 951 5477 
Fax: +44 (0)115 951 4159 
Running title: NGO performance and reporting accuracy 
 
                                                 
* We thank the editor and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. We thank Oliver 
Morrissey for comments on earlier drafts, Julien Labonne, Rafaelle Miniaci, Jan Stuhler for 
discussions, and participants at OxDev Workshop, German Development Research Group 
Conference (Gottingen), Nordic Econometrics Meeting (Tartu), Nottingham PhD Conference, 
North American Summer Meeting of Econometric Society (UC Davis) for comments and 
feedback. The collection of the Ugandan data was supported by the World Bank and the 
Japanese Government. Burger thanks the National Research Foundation of South Africa for 
their support (Grant Number: RCA13102556861). Dang thanks the Economics and Social 
Science Research Council [grant number ES/J500100/1] for their financial support; the YITP 
of the IAAE and the University of Brescia (Italy) for their hospitality. Usual disclaimer applies. 
Conflict of interest: none. 
 Abstract 
Improving ways to assess development outcomes and to identify corruption is considered 
imperative for NGO sustainability. Yet, little has been done to understand the connection 
between the effectiveness of NGOs and their financial accountability. We use Benford’s Law 
as a cost-effective and replicable measure to identify fraudulent financial reports of a 
representative sample of Ugandan NGOs. We find that 25% of the sample provided financial 
information that did not conform to the Benford distribution, suggesting cases of irregularities 
that a regulatory body would be advised to investigate. We observe NGOs with better ratings 
from their beneficiaries are more likely to submit credible financial data. This contradicts the 
belief that upward accountability demands crowd out serving the client community. We also 
distinguish between the decision to withhold requested financial information and the decision 
to report inaccurately. There is no evidence that the two decisions are related, with the decision 
to not provide all requested financial information attributed to limited capacity and skills. 
Based on these results, we recommend additional support for NGOs to assist with bookkeeping 
activities and an expansion of the larger role for beneficiary-based assessments in monitoring 
the sector.  
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1. Introduction   
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become an integral part of international 
development efforts. NGOs complement local governments by providing public goods and 
have become key players in channeling aid from local and international donors. In some cases, 
NGOs have displaced the traditional role of state institutions when donors, aiming to bypass 
corrupt governments, deliver aid through these non-state channels (Acht, Mahmoud, and Thiele 
2015). Increasingly, decentralized aid directed towards grassroots organisations are viewed as 
more responsive to the needs of intended beneficiary recipients (Mansuri and Rao 2012).  
The sector is not immune from its own cases of scandals related to misuse of funding 
and falsification of project outcomes (Chen 2016; Herzlinger 1996). Confronted with the 
continual need for financing, NGOs face growing incentives to produce “rose-colored” project 
reports that might misrepresent the beneficiaries’ circumstances and suppress failures and 
lessons learnt. This has eroded public trust and increased pressure for a greater level of financial 
transparency (Ebrahim 2003). The situation is further complicated by the current lack of 
effective methods to measure transparency and performance of development NGOs (Aldashev 
and Navarra 2018). Improving ways to identify corruption, assess development effectiveness, 
and monitor activities has become imperative for the sustainability of the NGO sector.  
In this paper, we advocate the use of an accounting technique, Benford’s Law, as a 
scalable and cost-effective tool to measure the level of errors in the financial data reported by 
development NGOs. We examine the link between self-reported financial data by NGOs and 
community-based evaluations of their performance, asking whether NGOs with better 
beneficiary-based assessments also report financial information more accurately. We study the 
determinants of financial transparency by distinguishing between the decision to withhold 
financial information when requested and the decision to report the information inaccurately.  
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Our paper relates to at least three topics of importance for development policy. First, 
it addresses concerns of development practitioners and donors who are often confronted with 
challenges in gauging misrepresentation in financial data and red-flagging dubious 
organizations. The standard measures in the literature, such as program ratios or the 
distributional discontinuity of specific categories, are of limited use due to scarcity of data 
(Zitzewitz 2012) and their ability to only detect irregularities in certain items on financial 
statements for a group of organizations.  
We present the first systematic example of using digital analyses to discover 
information irregularities for individual development NGOs. Using an original and 
representative dataset of the Ugandan NGO sector (see Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens 2003) and 
a digital analysis based on Benford’s Law, we are able to construct measures of misreporting 
in financial data for each surveyed Ugandan NGO. We find that 25% of the NGOs provide 
financial information that potentially differs from their real values.  
In a rapidly increasing sector, the method could be a useful screening for targeted 
auditing and reducing the costs of monitoring. The reason for its scalability and cost 
effectiveness is it relies on only two pieces of information, namely, the distribution of the 
leading digits of all numeric figures in an organization’s self-reported financial data (the 
observed distribution) and the theoretical Benford distribution. The method has two underlying 
principles. First, a dataset that contains naturally occurring numbers (without manipulation) 
will have the observed distribution of the first digits following a logarithmic distribution. A 
greater deviation between the observed distribution and the theoretical distribution indicates a 
greater level of information irregularities. Second, people cannot fabricate datasets that follow 
the Benford distribution even when instructed to do so (see Schulter, Mittenecker, and 
Papousek 2010); Boland and Hutchinson 2000). Given the context of a developing NGO in its 
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early days in early 2000s, the Ugandan NGO sector presents a unique opportunity to employ 
Benford’s Law and examine its usefulness for this sector.  
The second area of interest for development policy is evaluating NGO performance. 
Current evaluations of NGOs and projects rely on two sources, namely, NGO self-reported 
accounts presented in annual statements and community-based evaluations of NGO activities 
through end-of-project surveys (Aldashev and Navarra 2018).  While self-assessed reports are 
subject to misrepresentation and errors, they are often the only source for evaluating NGOs. 
Community-based evaluations are difficult to collect due to both logistical challenges and the 
high cost of surveys. It is therefore important to understand the respective contributions of these 
two information sources and also the alignment or misalignment between them.  
To date, there is no academic work mapping NGO self-reported accounts and 
beneficiary assessments. A mapping between the two sources provides an opportunity to cross-
check NGO self-reported accounts for donors and policymakers who are constrained 
(logistically or financially) in conducting community surveys. Using performance ratings from 
a community-based module conducted with the Ugandan NGO survey, we find a robust link 
between the two sources of NGO evaluation. NGOs that performed better, measured by a 
higher rate of satisfaction by their respective community, also reported financial information 
more accurately, measured by the digital analysis based on Benford’s Law. A battery of 
robustness checks shows that our results are not driven by a range of organizational 
characteristics, potential unobserved within-NGO heterogeneity, or the assumptions of the 
distributional and functional form.  
Finally, we examine the widespread belief in development debates that the high cost 
of upward accountability requirements such as financial reports crowds out downward 
accountability, i.e. serving the client community. To do so, we investigate factors influencing 
two reporting behaviors of NGOs, namely, strategic information withholding and misreporting. 
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This exercise provides a unique insight into NGO behavior that could be useful when designing 
aid contracts and incentive schemes to regulate and monitor the sectors financial activities. 
Indeed, while deliberate non-disclosure of financial accounts remains challenging to address, 
grassroot development organizations may have a legitimate concern over accountability tasks. 
NGOs with limited financial and human capital resources are often constrained in expending 
effort on bookkeeping activities.1 NGOs could voluntarily overlook some unneeded categories 
of financial data due to a genuine lack of capacity and staff skills rather than intentional 
misrepresentation. By comparing different modelling specifications under strategic 
withholding and genuine missing information, we show missing financial information in the 
Ugandan NGO sector could result from organizational constraints rather than strategic non-
disclosure. The tendency to fully report requested financial information does not correlate with 
the consequential reporting accuracy. NGOs with more clerks and a larger proportion of staff 
having a degree have a significantly higher propensity to provide full financial information 
when requested. Coupled with the evidence of a positive link between performance and 
reporting accuracy, the prevalence of financial misreporting in the Ugandan NGO sector could 
be driven by the lack of resources dedicated to accounting tasks rather than manipulation to 
hide mediocre performance. This result calls for additional support for NGOs to assist with 
bookkeeping activities.  
Our paper contributes to several branches of the literature. First, it adds to the literature 
on the regulation and activities of NGOs (Hatte and Koenig forthcoming, Aldashev and 
Navarra 2018). Second, our measure of misreporting relates to the growing literature on 
forensic economics (Zitzewitz 2012) and the use of distributional properties of numbers to 
                                                 
1 Epstein and Yuthas (2014) report that 80% of surveyed donors did not provide sufficient 
overhead allocations to cover the expenses their recipients incurred on reporting requirements. 
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identify potential misreporting in public data (see Fang and Gong 2017 for detection of 
overbilling in Medicare reimbursements; and Almond and Xia 2017 for detection of 
manipulation in investment returns of US non-profits). Our method adds to successful 
techniques that identify and measure corruption, such as randomized auditing of officials prior 
to elections (Avis, Ferraz, and Finan 2016) or targeted audits by local governments (Olken 
2007). Previous notable and methodological studies using Benford’s Law include Amiram, 
Bozanic, and Rouen (2015) for corporates’ financial accounts, Michalski and Stoltz (2013) for 
national statistics, and Judge and Schechter (2009) for survey data. Like any measure of fraud 
and corruption detection (see Olken and Pande 2012), digital analysis (e.g. Benford’s Law) is 
not completely fool-proof, nor does it serve as a substitute for auditing, however it does have 
the advantages of being  applicable to any financial and accounting reports and economic.  
Third, we examine the underlying mechanism of information disclosure and is the first 
such paper in development economics, adding to the broader literature on the topic that includes 
empirical applications in labor economics (Bettin, Lucchetti, and Zazzaro 2012 on remittances) 
and health economics (Dow and Norton 2003; Madden 2008 on cigarette consumption).  
Finally, our study on the link between NGOs’ self-reported accounts and community-
based evaluations adds to the literature on organizational performance and misreporting 
behavior of firms (Burns and Kedia 2006) and the recent theoretical papers on the misbehavior 
and monitoring in the NGO sector (Auriol and Brilon 2018; Aldashev, Jaimovich, and Verdier 
2018). Different from these theoretical studies highlighting the strategic interactions within the 
organizations and between donors and NGOs, we propose support for a separate and novel 
explanation based on limited resources for irregularities in the development NGO sector, 
particularly regarding information disclosure behavior.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 describes 
Benford’s Law and its application to our data. Section 4 provides a conceptual framework to 
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motivate our hypothesis, with a focus on distinguishing between selection models. A fuller 
model is provided in the Online Appendix A. We discuss our econometric strategy and results 
in Section 5. Section 6 reports a number of robustness checks and Section 7 concludes.  
2. The Ugandan NGO data 
We match data from two surveys conducted in 2002 with a representative sample of Ugandan 
NGOs and their beneficiaries. The first survey module (NGO questionnaire) was administered 
to a random sample of NGOs in 14 districts of Uganda (see Online Appendix Map OA.1) drawn 
from a verified NGO Registration List held with the Ministry of Planning within the Ugandan 
Government (details of sampling and a summary of the Ugandan NGO sector are available in 
(Barr et al. 2003). The face-to-face interviews with an NGO representative (usually the head 
of the NGO) was conducted by Ugandan field workers.2 Each session lasted for approximately 
two hours with the format, length and an overview of the questionnaire communicated to the 
NGO respondent beforehand. The questionnaire asked 255 questions, including queries 
regarding the organization’s expenditure and income (in 2001 and 2002), funding, governance 
and activities the NGO undertakes. In brief, the Ugandan NGOs engaged in a range of activities 
from advocacy (Human rights, HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention), capacity building 
(Education and Training, Counselling), to support activities to farmers and farming, child-
related services, water/sanitation or credit and microfinance provision. On average, the NGOs 
in our analysis existed for 9.8 years (standard deviation = 9 years) and offered on average four 
activities. (Barr et al. 2003) provide a comprehensive description of the Ugandan NGO sector. 
                                                 
2 At the beginning of the interview, the enumerator informed the NGO representative about the 
survey objective – conducted by academics to dispel confusion and improve knowledge 
regarding the NGO sector and assured participants that all information collected would be 
treated confidentially.”  
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 Questions regarding revenue and expenditure were designed such that the information 
was highly aggregated and should have been readily available from a standard annual account. 
If the respondent was unable to answer the questions, either the NGO representative was asked 
to request the information from a relevant colleague or the enumerator left the relevant sections 
of the questionnaire to be completed and collected on a designated day that suited the NGO. 
For larger NGOs, the enumerator gave the representative the relevant sections before the 
interview so that the NGO could prepare the required figures. The overriding instruction was 
to give advance warning of the data needed and ample opportunity to provide the information 
either directly via the respondent, a relevant colleague if they were unsure about their answers, 
or a return visit. Table A4 in the Appendix provides a sample of this information. In essence, 
the financial data collected resembles cash flows and financial statements of for-profit firms. 
Ideally, we expect a maximum of 60 pieces of financial information (non-zero financial 
transactions) to be recorded for each organization for each year, making a total of 120 financial 
items over two years for our digital analysis. In the field, however, we collected much fewer 
data points for the analysis (43 on average). We address the implications of this in Section 4 
and offer several statistical tests to accommodate the smaller sample size.  
The second survey module captured community characteristics, needs and perceptions 
of the NGO via a structured focus group interview conducted with beneficiary communities 
following a well-defined protocol to ensure comparability across communities. In the initial 
NGO interview, each NGO was asked to report up to six parishes in which it had been active. 
One of the parishes was selected at random for a focus group interview.3 The enumerator 
contacted the parish leader asking them to recruit between six to ten community members for 
                                                 
3 The enumerators in the focus group interview used a series of questions to filter out focus 
groups that did not know about the NGO. 
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the group meeting. The selection process ensured comparability and consistency of the 
community evaluation across NGOs. The structured interview assessed how the beneficiary 
communities evaluated the NGOs surveyed in the first module. The focus group participants 
were asked to evaluate their satisfaction with the NGO’s performance by rating the statement 
“the people who live in this parish are satisfied with the performance of [NGO]” on a Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree). We use this satisfaction rating in our main 
analysis as it captures the general, collective perception of the NGO’s performance. In addition, 
we collected other perceptions of the focus group regarding the NGOs accessibility, 
competence, importance to the community, and responsiveness to community needs. The 
Online Appendix G discusses the correlation of these measures with our general measure and 
the robustness of our results using these alternative ratings. Our conclusions are not altered.4  
                                                 
4 The ideal method to randomly choose focus group participants would have been to randomly 
choose beneficiaries from a list instead of going through the parish leader. One potential caveat 
of our selection method is that some of the listed NGOs might have had favorable connections 
with the parish leaders, who could then have selected focus group participants to give favorable 
evaluations, thus  potentially introducing bias to our study. However, the ideal randomization 
was not feasible for funding and logistics reasons. In practice, we believe the results are not 
biased by this concern. Leaders were not told the name of the NGO being evaluated before 
selecting the meeting participants. It is therefore unlikely that the leaders could have ex-ante 
strategically recruited a biased focus group favoring the NGO. Anecdotally, some enumerators 
needed to prompt the group about the NGO being evaluated. Barr and Fafchamps (2006) 
provide further description of the second module. 
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We match the NGO surveyed in the first module with the respective community from 
the second module.5 During the data compiling process, we discovered four enumerators had 
exhibited “cheating incidents” while conducting the NGO interviews.6 To ensure that any 
misreporting detected by our indices are knowingly attributable to the concerned NGO only, 
we drop the sample collected by these enumerators. We are left with a sample of 104 NGOs 
matched with 104 communities.  
3. Using Benford’s Law to detect potential misreporting  
There is a well-developed accounting literature focusing on measuring irregularities in 
financial reports. Methods include accrual-based estimates from the Jones models or analyses 
using distributional properties of financial figures (see Amiram et al. 2015). There are, 
however, several weaknesses inherent in both approaches. First, measures estimated from 
prediction models suffer from sample selection bias and measurement errors as they are based 
on the error terms of regressions on firms’ predicted values (Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010). 
Second, these measures require strong assumptions about the organization’s objective function 
and managers’ incentives, which are not always realistic and could induce correlation between 
the measures and the organization’s characteristics. Third, these models require forward-
looking information to construct predictions and often detailed time-series and panel data. This 
requirement often tempers their use in non-profit studies, in which small sample size and 
comprehensive data collection are the main challenges. The current non-profit literature only 
focuses on potential errors in some specific categories such as investment returns (Almond and 
                                                 
5 As there were cases when some NGOs were linked to more than one community, we randomly 
eliminate 19 duplicates to ensure a 1:1 relationship throughout the analysis. 
6 It is a common problem in collecting survey data (see Judge and Schechter 2009). 
10 
 
Xia 2017), fundraising ratio and program ratios (Hofmann and McSwain 2013). This focus 
ignores the fact that organizations could manipulate the data as the whole.  
We advocate Benford's Law as an alternative way for measuring the accuracy of self-
reported financial information when only standard information on a financial statement are 
available. It is a mathematical law regarding the frequency distribution of leading digits in 
naturally occurring datasets (e.g., the leading digit of the number 1,201.17 is 1). Contrary to 
the basic intuition, the occurrence of each digit as the first digit is not equally likely (uniform). 
Instead, the first digits would follow a decreasing distribution specified in Hill's (1995) 
theorem. It states that random samples, over different orders of magnitudes taken from a 
random mix of non-truncated and uncensored distributions, will have the frequency of the first 
digits converging to the logarithmic of a distribution, dubbed the Benford distribution (See 
Appendix A).7 Financial transactions are a popular example of a random mix of non-truncated 
and uncensored distributions as they arise from interactions and behaviors of independent 
individuals. Since accurate financial records are based on repeated sums, multiplications, or 
quotients of prices, quantities, and financial transactions, accurately reported financial and 
accounting data are often expected to follow Benford’s Law (Boyle, 1994). As people are rarely 
capable of making up datasets that follow a specific distribution (see psychology studies such 
as Schulter et al. 2010;  Hill 1998), biased reports are expected to deviate from the law. 
We exploit this property of financial data to uncover information irregularities of 
Ugandan NGOs. Durtschi, Hillison, and Pacini (2004) outline three requirements for applying 
Benford’s Law to empirical data. First, the data should not have a built-in maximum/minimum. 
Second, there should not be any externally assigned values. Third, the distribution should be 
                                                 
7 An order of magnitude is a proxy for the number of the digits that a number has in the base-
ten system. For example, the order of magnitude of 14500 is 4 as 14500 = 1.45 × 104. 
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positively skewed with a median that is lower than the mean. Our NGO data satisfies all these 
criteria for applying Benford’s Law. The law is also an appealing method for the type of data 
often available for development NGOs which normally does not allow for the calculation 
of the other standard measures discussed earlier in this section.8 
 Measuring the extent that a dataset deviates from Benford’s distribution has been 
debated in the digital analysis literature (see Morrow 2014; Miller 2015). Measures can be 
strongly influenced by the number of digits used, with some statistics requiring near-perfect 
conformity to the theoretical distribution to not reject the null of conformity (Nigrini 2012). 
Following Amiram et al. (2015), we use the Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) statistic in the 
main analysis, and report results using other popular measures derived from Benford’s Law in 
Appendix B. The MAD statistic is calculated as the mean of the absolute difference between 
the empirical proportion of each digit in each NGO’s aggregated financial reports and their 








                                                 
8 There may be concern that our result is driven by random errors introduced during the 
interview by either the respondent or interviewer rounding up the numbers. This issue is 
not critical. First, as our measure of information accuracy relies solely on the first digit of the 
numbers submitted, the usual rounding of the last digit is not a concern. Second, we obtain 
qualitatively unchanged results when we exclude from our analysis five NGOs whose reported 
numbers looked as if they were potentially rounded. These NGOs have more than 90% of their 
submitted financial figures that start by a digit followed by zeros (for example, 8000 shillings). 
The implication is that heavy rounding does not affect our analysis. 
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where di = 1, 2, … , 9 represents the first digit; Po(di) is the observed frequency of digit di, and 
Pe(di) is the expected frequency of digit 𝑑𝑖 according to Table A1. Using simulated 
experiments, Amiram et al. (2015) show that the degree of deviation from the Benford 
distribution strongly correlates with the degree of errors introduced into the financial 
statements. That is, the larger the MAD statistic, the further the deviation from the theoretical 
distribution under the null hypothesis that the aggregated report is free of errors. 
We construct the degree of reporting accuracy of NGOs by subtracting the level of 
reporting inaccuracy (MAD) from the (arbitrarily chosen) number one. For NGOs without all 
requested information, we assign the reporting accuracy as zero to allow for estimating the 
Cragg model (discussed in the next section). The dependent variable of interest is:9  
Ri = {
1 − MAD                      if Ci(. ) = 1 
0                                     if Ci(. ) = 0
 (2) 
where higher Ri indicates that the complete report is more accurate.  
Since there is no critical value associated with the MAD statistic, it could be 
impractical for flagging potential misreporting. Due to the small sample size, we employ the 
two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistic to test the hypothesis that the observed distribution 
of all the first digits follows the Benford distribution. Figure 1 presents the results of this 
exercise. Panel A shows evidence to support the applicability of Benford's Law to our data. 
When combining available numerical data from all the Ugandan NGOs, the distribution of the 
first digits of all the financial figures closely follows the Benford distribution, confirming our 
premise that accounting data follows the law.10 Based on the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test 
                                                 
9 This assignment does not affect the estimation procedure of Heckman’s model as only the 
sample with complete disclosure is used in the second step. 
10 Note that the conformity of the data does not prevent the possibility that some individual 
NGOs may have inaccurate financial data. The reason is that the overall conformity may come 
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statistic, we reject the null hypothesis of complying with Benford’s Law for 25% of the NGOs. 
In the rest of this paper we refer to such cases as the NGOs “deviate” from the law, suggesting 
that financial accounts of these organizations might frequently contain mistakes, errors or 
misreporting. Panel B provides a representative distribution of this group. In contrast, Panel C 
presents a representative NGO out of the remaining 75% of the sample where we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis. As shorthand we will say that these NGOs “conform” to Benford’s law, 
indicating that we fail to find evidence of misreporting (i.e. cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the observed distribution follows the Benford distribution).  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
4. A conceptual framework 
We review previous theoretical papers to conceptualize factors behind reporting behavior of 
an agent, focusing on whether and how accurately they reveal their financial information. The 
Online Appendix OA presents a formal model. 
4.1 Why do NGOs provide incomplete financial information? 
Despite the surveys being designed to make providing financial information easy, several 
NGOs provided only some of the requested financial figures. In this paper, we define an NGO 
as providing complete financial information (complete disclosure) if their representative 
provided all requested expenditure-related and revenue-related figures for both 2001 and 2002 
fiscal years. There are 77 such NGOs in the sample. We define NGOs as having incomplete 
disclosure if they failed to provide either revenue-related figures or expenditure-related figures 
or both (those items recorded as missing). The remaining 27 NGOs fall into this category.  
                                                 
from a mixture of independent errors embedded in different NGO data. According to Hill's 
(1995) theorem, these independent errors would result in a mixture of independent distributions 
whose mixed distribution would follow Benford's Law. 
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We aim to understand the mechanisms driving these non-disclosure incidents. For 
NGOs who did not provide all the requested figures (25% of the sample), we must make 
assumptions about their (potential) accuracy: some of these NGOs may have possessed all the 
requested financial information but chose (strategically) to provide none or only a part of their 
data; other NGOs may simply not have had the data (because they did not have the necessary 
resources or financial skills to compile such information). We want to treat the former as latent 
observations (i.e. available but not provided) and the latter as actual zeros (the NGO provided 
all available information, even if the incomplete information yields an accuracy level of zero 
about their financial situation).  
Following Verrecchia’s (2001) taxonomy we label the first case discretionary-based 
disclosure. A sender (here the surveyed NGO) observes private information about the true state 
of their financial situation and strategically communicates to a receiver (donors or the 
enumerator) at their own discretion. As such, incomplete disclosure can be optimal due to 
several ex-post costs associated with complete disclosure. First, the information disclosed 
could reveal either the human capital of the NGO leader, for instance incompetence, or 
managerial incentives, or the organization’s inefficiency (see (Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 
2009). Second, an NGO that revealed unusual expenses might need to exert resources to justify 
the spending to their beneficiaries or donors. Third, an altruistic NGO who is incentivized to 
disclose incorrect information may incur costs due to an intrinsic aversion to lying (Gneezy, 
Rockenbach, and Serra-Garcia 2013). In such cases, the NGO may withhold some financial 
figures, despite having access to all the requested information. Such strategic incomplete 
disclosure causes a problem of data observability: the reason underlying partial information 
may correlate with the latent level of reporting accuracy. Such a correlation could severely bias 
our estimates of interest. 
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Again, following Verrechia’s (2001), we label the second case as efficiency-based 
disclosure. Here, non-disclosure is an efficient choice of resource allocation. The intuition is 
that if the organization commits to disclosure, ex post complete disclosure will incur costs of 
information acquisition, such as hiring professional accountants or spending resources on 
book-keeping. Expecting that these costs will outweigh any potential benefits, the organization 
ex ante chooses non-disclosure to avoid the costs associated with a full disclosure as a corner 
solution. In our context, an NGO subject to constrained resources could decide ex-ante to 
gather only information that is necessary and productive to their operation. As such, the 
decision whether to provide complete disclosure is taken before (and independent from) the 
enumerator’s visit and may be separated from the decision on the accuracy of financial 
information had complete disclosure been acquired. The NGO representative provided all 
available information during the interview even if it was incomplete. In this case, the 
incomplete disclosure observed is not a strategic communication to withhold information, but 
rather a corner solution to a maximization problem, subject to some ex-ante resource 
constraint.11 
4.2 Do NGOs with better performance report more accurately? 
We examine whether better performing NGOs, as evaluated by their direct beneficiary 
community, provide more accurate financial accounts when asked by a third party. One 
                                                 
11 Another explanation is that the NGO has no incentive to reveal their financial situation to the 
enumerator. The enumerator was instructed to pitch the survey as to enable the Uganda 
government and donors to better assist NGOs. We, therefore, restrict our analysis based on the 
two explanations above. To account for potential heterogeneity of the enumerator, such as 
NGOs responded differently to different enumerators, we include dummies of the enumerators’ 
IDs and receive similar results.  
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prediction is that high-performance organizations have incentives to disclose more information 
to differentiate themselves favorably from other organizations with "bad news" and thus avoid 
the problem of adverse selection (Dye 1986). This reasoning implies that because performance 
is not directly observable to the interested parties, NGOs who serve their communities well 
will seek to reveal their performance type: better performing NGOs would have less to hide, 
thereby provide accurate information. Meanwhile, NGOs who are underperforming would 
have incentives to manage their figures to increase the possibility of earning new grants, which 
are often tied to performance (Healy 1985). “Good” organizations also have an incentive to 
issue detailed and accurate records of their financial situation to avoid potential punishment 
associated with being detected as untruthful, which could "create doubt about the true motive 
for which good deeds are performed" (Bénabou and Tirole 2006). We formalize this prediction 
in the alternative form (the implicit null hypothesis is that there is no significant relationship). 
𝐻1𝑎: Higher evaluated performance in serving beneficiary communities is positively 
associated with the accuracy of the NGO’s financial figures. 
Since keeping accurate and up-to-date financial records is costly and time-consuming, 
as it often requires the NGOs to divert resources away from community services, there may 
exist a trade-off between community satisfaction and reporting accuracy. That is, an NGO 
could exert effort in providing better services to their beneficiaries while spending less 
resources on accountability tasks. We formalize this alternative prediction as: 
𝐻1𝑏: Higher evaluated performance in serving beneficiary communities is negatively 
associated with the accuracy of the NGO’s financial figures. 
In sum, there are two explanations for an NGO to provide incomplete information: (i) 
the NGO strategically withholds some information even when complete information is 
available; and (ii) the NGO chooses ex-ante to record only some necessary information. The 
mechanism underlying each case is different. While the decision to withhold under (i) may be 
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correlated with the consequent reporting accuracy; the data unavailability under (ii) could be 
assumed independent of the decision governing the consequent reporting accuracy. We also 
hypothesize that NGOs with better performance ratings would have an incentive to report 
credible figures, i.e. closer to their true values. We test this hypothesis against the alternative 
that NGOs might divert resources away from bookkeeping activities toward actual community 
services so that better performing organizations fall short of their financial report quality. 
Figure 2 represents a flowchart to summarize our conceptual framework, highlighting the two 
cases of incomplete information in our survey. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
5. Econometric methodology and analysis 
5.1 Deliberate deviations from Benford’s Law and unintended inaccuracies 
We first examine whether incomplete information occurs exogenously or endogenously. As 
reviewed in Section 4, when financial information was requested an NGO could have: first, 
decided whether to provide the enumerator with all the information requested (both expenditure 
and revenue related figures); second, if it did provide a full account, the NGO could then have 
decided on the level of accuracy of the information. Formally, let C𝑖(. ) be a binary function 
for NGO i such that Ci(. ) = 1 if i provides all requested information in the first stage, 0 
otherwise. Let Ri be the measure of reporting accuracy of NGO 𝑖 in the second stage once we 
observe all requested information. 𝑋𝑖, 𝑆𝑖 are the observable determinants of the outcome 
equation (the degree of reporting accuracy) and the selection equation (whether to provide all 
requested figures). The empirical models can be specified as follows: 
𝐶𝑖(. ) = 𝛼
′𝑆𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 (Stage 1)                                   (3) 
           𝑅𝑖




∗ is the optimal degree of reporting accuracy of NGO 𝑖; 𝑣𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖 are error terms of the 
two stages. For NGOs with full information, 𝑅𝑖
∗ = 𝑅𝑖; whereas treating 𝑅𝑖
∗ for NGOs with 
incomplete information must depend on the mechanism of why incomplete information arises.  
If the incomplete information is an ex-ante decision (the efficiency-based disclosure), 
the two choices on whether to report all requested information, and on how accurately to report, 
are governed by two independent mechanisms. Incomplete information is a corner solution that 
could be caused by a budget constraint (gathering full information is ex-ante financially 
infeasible) or the lack of skills or clerks (exogenous sample selection due to independent 
variables). Formally, once controlling for the observables, there would be no factor 
unobservable to the econometrician to affect the two choices of the NGO. The error terms in 
the two stages are uncorrelated 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑣𝑖, 𝑢𝑖) = 0. Incomplete disclosure is a genuine observation 
and the NGOs with incomplete information could be treated as genuinely having zero-
accuracy. The appropriate model would be a Tobit-type with censoring point at 𝑅∗ = 0 as in 
Equation (5). Practically, we use the Cragg (1971) double-hurdle model for censored responses 
to allow for two different mechanisms underlying the selection and the outcome decision. 
Another attractive feature of Cragg’s model is that homoscedasticity and normality conditions 
are less necessary for its consistency (Wooldridge 2010). 
𝑅𝑖
∗ = {
𝑅𝑖                             if 𝐶𝑖(. ) > 0    
0                                     otherwise
 (Tobit model)             (5) 
In contrast, if the incomplete information is an ex-post strategic decision, the two 
stages are governed by two related mechanisms: NGOs after considering their level of reporting 
accuracy at Stage 2 would decide on whether to reveal full information at Stage 1 (endogenous 
sample selection on the dependent variable). Full disclosure is met only when the second-stage 
optimal level of reporting accuracy exceeds a reservation level of accuracy 𝑅. Otherwise, the 
NGO strategically withholds some information, causing sample selection bias. Formally, even 
after controlling for observables, there would still be common factors affecting both the stages 
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(for example, the reservation level of reporting accuracy). The error terms are correlated in this 
case: 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) ≠ 0. We cannot assign NGOs with incomplete information as having zero-
accuracy as before because doing so would lump NGOs genuinely without all requested 
information and NGOs strategically withholding information. The level of report accuracy of 
the latter are available but unobservable to the researchers because of the withholding. We 
assign the value of reporting accuracy for these organizations as a latent observation, instead 
of genuinely zero. The appropriate model would be a Heckman selection model as:  
Ri
∗ = {
Ri               if Ci(. ) > 0 and Ri
∗ ≥ R
NA                                      otherwise
  (Heckman model)                              (6) 
In sum, we have three categories of NGO: (i) an incomplete disclosure (corner-
solution) group who did not keep a complete financial record due to constraints (such as fixed 
costs of information gathering); (ii) another incomplete disclosure group who kept a complete 
financial record but withheld some information; and (iii) a group who kept complete financial 
record which they provided to the enumerators.  
To infer the dominating selection mechanism that explains the incomplete disclosure 
we identify the appropriate model that fits the data statistically, similar to Dow and Norton 
(2003) and Bettin et al. (2012). The standard approach is to check the significance of the inverse 
Mills ratio coefficient generated from the Heckman sample selection model. However, Norton, 
Dow, and Do (2008) and Silva, Tenreyro, and Windmeijer (2015) argue that this does not give 
reliable information about the ability of the models to describe truncated response data.12 
Instead we use Vuong (1989) non-nested hypothesis LR test (see Online Appendix B) and a 
regression-based specification test under heteroskedasticity developed by (Silva et al. 2015) 
                                                 
12 Dow and Norton (2003) instead propose an adjusted empirical mean square error test, which 
is computationally more difficult to implement. 
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based on Davidson and MacKinnon (1981).13 If the Cragg’s model is preferred, we conclude 
that once controlling for NGO characteristics, the decision to have incomplete information is 
unrelated to the decision to manipulate the latent report. Otherwise, if the Heckman’s model is 
preferred this indicates strategic withholding of information. To our knowledge, this approach 
is the first conducted in the literature on information asymmetry. 
5.2 The empirical specification  
Following the hypothesis in Section 4, the estimation equations for the degree of accuracy and 
the selection model for providing all requested information are: 14   
𝑅𝑖
∗ = 𝛼1 + γPerformancei + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽1 + 𝑢𝑖 (7) 
𝐶𝑖(. ) = 𝛼2 + λPerformancei + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽2 + 𝑍2𝑖𝛾2 + 𝑣𝑖 (8) 
where 𝑅𝑖 is the accuracy measure from Benford’s Law, and 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 is the 
evaluation of NGO ’s performance as measured by the respective community(ranked on the 
Likert scale: 1 = least satisfied and 5 = most satisfied).  
𝑍2𝑖 is the exclusion restriction variable to ensure the consistency of the Heckman 
estimation. We use a binary variable of whether members of the NGO need to vote before the 
organization introduces any new activity (Member involvement = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise). The 
rationale for the exclusion restriction is as follows. Stronger member involvement may create 
incentives and pressure for the NGO to have financial records ready for inspection. Yet, there 
                                                 
13 We implement the test using command –hpc-- in Stata, provided by Silva et al. (2015). 
14 Within-district observations might share common characteristics (a local social norm) that 
may affect the decisions regarding disclosure and accuracy. Including dummies for 14 districts 
is not a viable option as it substantially reduces the degree of freedom. We report here robust 
standard errors clustered at the district level (acknowledging that 14 districts are too few for 
reliable clustering) as the results are qualitatively similar without clustering. 
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is no reason to believe such involvement would directly impact the accuracy of financial 
records that the NGO prepares. Olken (2007) uses randomized control trials to show that 
grassroots participations of the beneficiary communities in monitoring projects had little 
impact on corrupt behavior of the contracted agents. We expect that Member involvement is a 
significant explanatory variable of the selection mechanism but can be excluded from the 
equation of reporting accuracy.    
𝑋𝑖 is a vector of NGO characteristics suggested in the existing literature as possible 
explanatory variables of information disclosure and reporting accuracy of nonprofit 
organizations. To account for the concern that smaller NGOs may have fewer transactions that 
make their data inherently noisier, we include Number of non-zeros to capture the number of 
non-zero financial transactions used to calculate our indices by Benford’s Law. The rest of the 
controls are as follows.  
Monitoring body: We include two variables: (i) whether the NGO has a board of 
directors or trustees to oversee its activities (Oversight Board = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise) and (ii) 
whether the NGO has officially registered as a company (Registered as Company = 1 if yes, 0 
otherwise) to capture the effect of company status on NGO behavior by placing more scrutiny 
and regulations on registered companies.  
Financing source: We proxy for the accountability pressure from donors by a binary 
of whether the NGO ever received a grant (Received Grant = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise). 
Cost of information gathering: We capture the resources needed for accounting 
procedures with: (i) the number of clerical staff working for the NGOs (Clerical staff) and (ii) 
the proportion of paid employees having a tertiary education or a degree (% Professional 
Degrees). We use: (i) NGO Age (the years of existence to 2002) to proxy for reputation concern 
and 𝑁𝐺𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒2 to account for potential differences in behavior of the more established NGOs, 
and (ii) the number of years the manager has been with the NGO (Tenure) to examine the effect 
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of career concerns over financial misreporting (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995). Following Burger 
and Owens (2010), we use the number of reports per year required by granting bodies (Reports 
per year) to capture reporting fatigue due to heavier administrative costs. 
Religious adherence:  a binary variable of whether the NGO is affiliated with a 
religion (Religion = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise). One mechanism whereby religion might influence 
organizational transparency is through the frequent reminder of (religious) moral codes of 
conduct (McGuire, Omer, and Sharp 2012).  
Attitude towards governance. First, we include two binary variables for whether the 
NGO cites Lack of funding (= 1 if yes, 0 otherwise) and Lack of skilled staff (= 1 if yes, 0 
otherwise) as constraints preventing them from doing an even better job. Second, we use a 
binary variable of whether the NGO views the local government as a hindrance to their 
activities (Government as hindrance = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise) to capture the antagonistic 
idealism that may oppose the sectoral norm of accountability and donor demands publicly. 
Third, we use a continuous variable of how long the manager worked in the Ugandan 
government before joining the NGO (Years working in government) to capture both political 
connection of these NGOs and potential spill-over effects of the corruption in Ugandan 
government and public service departments in the 2000s (Deininger and Mpuga 2005).  
5.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the data. 77 NGOs (74% of the sample) provided 
information on both revenue and expenses information. There is no significant difference in 
performance between these 77 NGOs and the 27 NGOs that did not provide complete data. Of 
those that provided information, 58 conform to the Benford distribution of first digits using the 
two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test at the 10% confidence level. The average performance 
of these NGOs was higher than that of the 19 NGOs whose financial figures did not conform. 
To preview, Figure 3 supports our hypothesis of a positive mapping between the evaluated 
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performance and the level of report accuracy when using the naïve OLS estimation without 
correcting for potential sample selection bias and missing information. We report the estimates 
in Column (3) in Table OA3 (the Online Appendix). We find a positive relationship between 
the measure of reporting accuracy and each of the alternative measures of NGO performance, 
but estimates are not as precise.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
5.4 Complete disclosure and determinants 
Table 2 presents the results for determinants of the NGO’s decision to provide an incomplete 
set of financial figures even though the requested information was standard and should have 
been readily available. The estimates are as expected. Having an oversight board of directors 
or trustees is significantly and negatively associated with the propensity to provide all requested 
information to a third party. One explanation is the “unintended chilling effect” suggested by 
Cormier, Magnan, and Van Velthoven (2005). That is, for established organizations, the board 
of directors places less pressure on internal governance. In our case, the oversight board may 
place lesser importance on a full record of standard financial figures, and the NGO, subject to 
board agreement, may have decided to keep only necessary data. Being registered as a company 
is not significantly associated with a higher propensity to complete disclosure. This result raises 
a question of effective monitoring over companies by responsible ministers in the Ugandan 
government office in the early 2000s (for a similar discussion, see Deininger and Mpuga 2005).  
Having received a grant is a positive predictor of complete disclosure. Previous studies 
posit that organizations that need to facilitate fundraising activities have a higher propensity 
for information disclosure (Jensen and Meckling 1979). Transparent financial records may 
serve as a signaling vehicle to attract funding. Having a religious affiliation is a positive 
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predictor of complete disclosure, replicating McGuire et al (2011). Regular reminders of moral 
codes through religious preaching could be effective in promoting transparency.  
We also find significant associations of reputation loss and manager’s career concerns 
with the propensity to complete disclosure. There exists a significant U-shape effect of the 
organization’s reputation proxied by NGO Age and NGO Age2. More established NGOs tend 
to conform to the sectoral norm in financial reporting; while older organizations may become 
complacent over time and be more relaxed with the sectoral standard (the “unintended chilling 
effect”). Regarding career concerns, there exists a significantly negative relationship between 
the manager's tenure length and the disclosure propensity. Besides the chilling effect, senior 
managers may care less about the future job market which commonly values transparency. 
These managers are also the most familiar with the operations of the NGO and may decide that 
selectively keeping necessary information may be an efficient strategy.  
There is no statistical association between poorer performance and incomplete 
disclosure, suggesting that it is not the performance that incentivizes the NGOs to withhold 
information from a third party. Instead, we find evidence that lack of human resources could 
be a significant constraint towards transparency in the Ugandan NGO sector. NGOs with fewer 
clerks and a smaller proportion of staff holding degrees are significantly less likely to provide 
all requested information. Organizations endowed with a smaller qualified workforce may be 
constrained and possibly reluctant to expend resources to keep all the standard financial data.  
NGOs whose managers consider government as a hindrance to their daily operation 
are less likely to provide all requested financial information. One potential explanation is that 
they perceive the government as antagonistic and may worry about how the government would 
use their organizational information. This would capture service delivery NGOs that are critical 
towards the government and organizations with a political advocacy or watchdog role. 
Managers may have responded to the lack of human resources and transparency burden by 
25 
 
selectively recording figures they saw as necessary to the NGO’s operation. We also find that 
enabling members to vote for new services is strongly correlated with the higher propensity to 
complete disclosure. This result highlights the benefit of involving members to pressurize 
management on transparency and accountability issues. The significance of Member 
Involvement also gives support for the exclusion restriction of our Heckman estimation. 
There are several surprising results. We find no significant association between the 
number of reports requested per year by granting bodies and the propensity to provide all 
standard information. Nor do we find NGOs who claim lack of skilled staff and funding as 
major constraints to their operation to have a different propensity to provide all requested 
information. There are two explanations for the insignificant results. First, although the signs 
of the variables are as expected, the small sample size may lead to imprecise estimates. Second, 
there may be biases due to endogeneity. Table OA1 in the Online Appendix shows that 
claiming lack of skilled staff as a major constraint becomes significantly associated with a 
lower propensity to be transparent once we control for endogeneity (see Section 6.1).   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 presents the results for Vuong’s (1989) and the HPC by Silva et al. (2015) 
model selection tests to distinguish the mechanism underlying the data unavailability.15 Both 
the statistics unanimously indicate the double-hurdle model fits our data better than the 
Heckman model. Statistically, the mechanism underlying incomplete disclosure is a corner-
solution censoring – controlling for observables, any unobservable confounders underlying the 
decision to complete disclosure and the decision of report accuracy, are uncorrelated. We reject 
                                                 
15 According to Silva et al. (2015), the name stands for a test under heteroskedasticity (H), 
combining the P test, which conditions on estimates under the alternative, and the C test, which 
conditions on estimates under both the null and the alternative. 
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the hypothesis that there exists some reservation level of report accuracy such that the NGO 
would withhold some financial figures if their report accuracy fails to exceed the reservation 
level. Our discussion above suggests the fixed costs of information gathering and human 
resource constraints being the key reasons for providing incomplete financial information.  
Although a corner solution censoring mechanism fits the Ugandan data better, the two 
models provide similar results. We refer to the estimates using the double-hurdle model in the 
next section, noting that the discussion is also valid for the Heckman model. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
5.5 Mapping report accuracy and NGO performance  
We support the hypothesis that NGOs with higher evaluated performance report financial 
information more accurately, regardless of the mechanism underlying their disclosure policy. 
The evaluated performance, however, is an insignificant predictor of the propensity to provide 
all requested financial data. We interpret the insignificance of performance as further support 
for a double-hurdle censoring model: two independent mechanisms govern the two decisions. 
The decision to disclose all requested information is not related to the performance of the 
organization but rather the NGOs capacity and human capital. The decision to report 
accurately, however, relates to higher ratings of performance, perhaps to reveal their type or 
avoid punishment of being detected as untruthful as in Benabou and Tirole (2006).  
The estimates for other NGO characteristics in Table 2 align with our expectations. 
Having registered as a company positively correlates with higher reporting accuracy, possibly 
due to regulatory effects or interactions with other companies that are more experienced in 
accounting tasks. A U-shape relationship also emerges between the organization age and the 
accuracy of their reported data. While more established NGOs report more accurately, the data 
for the most established organizations becomes less credible. Besides the complacency 
explanation, the scale of bookkeeping in larger organizations may lead to more errors in the 
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process of information gathering if the clerical staff in charge do not receive sufficient training 
(Keating and Frumkin 2003). We do not find any significant association of having more clerks 
and staff with professional degrees on reporting accuracy. Although having a larger workforce 
increases the propensity to complete disclosure, it is not statistically associated with higher 
report accuracy. Consistent with anecdotal observations in the Ugandan NGO sector, we 
conjecture that the lack of training may be one explanation. Another supporting piece of 
evidence is that a higher number of reported financial figures (Number of non-zeros) positively 
correlates with the conformity of the data with the Benford distribution. 
Longer exposure to government bureaucracy correlates with a lower degree of report 
accuracy. One explanation is the spill-over effect of the corruption prevalent in Ugandan 
government offices during the time (McCormick 1990). Since the Ugandan public sector in 
early 2000s was plagued with corruption (Deininger and Mpuga 2005), NGO managers 
switching from government jobs may have carried the ethos to their new positions. This is in 
line with Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011) who found that politically connected firms 
reported poorer quality accounting information than non-connected firms. The political 
connection reduces the need to respond to regulatory pressures from the authority and the 
donation market, thus allowing them to disclose lower quality accounting information. Our 
results highlight the need to strengthen the accountability of the overseeing body to effectively 
monitor the NGO sector. 
Regarding reporting fatigue, more burdensome reporting requests from donors are 
significantly associated with lower reporting accuracy. Consistent with Burger and Owens' 
(2010) finding on information misrepresentation, NGOs could submit lower quality financial 
data as a useful deflection strategy in response to heavy, and possibly unreasonable, demands 
from donors, while complying sufficiently to maintain grants. Summary statistics in Table 1 
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show that NGOs with lower report quality are requested to submit on average two reports per 
year (and those with the lowest accuracy can have up to 12 reports requested each year).16  
6. Robustness checks 
We next report the robustness of our results to potential endogeneity between performance and 
reporting accuracy, alternative measures of reporting accuracy, and the functional form and 
distribution assumptions of the specifications.   
6.1 Robust to endogeneity between performance and reporting accuracy  
The main analysis accounts for sample selection by a Heckman correction model. Yet, there 
remains another concern of omitted variable bias, namely, altruistic NGOs could self-commit 
to deliver both higher performance and financial transparency. Although we aim to mitigate 
the bias caused by the omitted self-commitment with a battery of control variables, the concern 
remains possible. We propose an instrumental variable strategy to reduce the bias.  
A valid set of instrumental variables, 𝑍𝑖, should have a strong correlation with the 
evaluated performance but be independent of any strategic behavior of the concerned NGO. 
Finding the set is challenging for two reasons. First, NGO characteristics are unlikely to satisfy 
the exclusion restrictions as they could be correlated with the unobserved NGO ability. Second, 
most of the community characteristics (e.g. available infrastructure, prosperity indicators, 
                                                 
16 One counterargument is that donors simply adjust their demands towards organizations that 
are more likely to behave in a dubious manner. This unobservable heterogeneity could bias our 
finding. We argue our explanation still holds. First, as the Ugandan NGO sector had been 
expanding both horizontally and vertically, there was hardly a shortage of organizations 
available so that the donors had to compromise and use dubious NGOs. Second, even after 
controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity that relates to the organization’s ability and 
potential manipulation (see Section 6.1), the negative association remains (see Table A3). 
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employment rates) are also likely to be invalid as more able NGOs could strategically locate in 
convenient areas that could enable them to serve the community better (Brass 2012). We 
propose two instruments from the characteristics of the focus group participants: (i) the 
percentage of the group older than 55 and (ii) the percentage of the group who have a 
connection with the concerned NGO, e.g. a staff or an NGO member.17     
Our identification assumption is that certain demographics of the focus group 
(connection with the NGO and average age of focus group members) could strongly predict 
the (evaluated) performance of an NGO. Groups with more respondents with a connection to 
an NGO may report higher satisfaction because the NGO has exerted effort in addressing 
specific needs of the community. Similarly, if the needs of a particular demographic are less 
well-served we would expect a focus group with a higher proportion of this demographic to 
result in lower satisfaction scores. The intuition comes from documented institutional 
characteristics of the NGO sector. Barr and Fafchamps (2006) and Fruttero and Gauri (2005) 
show that many NGOs are often less inclined to work in remote and poorer communities 
despite these places often being the neediest and requiring the most attention. Evidence 
suggests some NGOs do not always try their best to serve the community, resulting in 
heterogeneous degrees of communities’ satisfaction. Likewise, specific to Uganda there is 
evidence that no NGO reported any service or activity that specifically targeted the elderly 
(Barr et al. 2003). Using this intuition, we expect that groups with more respondents with a 
connection to an NGO would report higher satisfaction because the NGO has exerted effort in 
interacting with their community. In addition, we expect NGOs working in areas with a larger 
proportion of elderly would receive a significantly lower satisfaction score since the needs of 
                                                 
17 In the survey beneficiaries were asked to report the number of focus group participants 
between the age of under 25; from 25 to 39; from 40 to 54 and over 55.  
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this group are less well-served. F-tests and coefficients in Panel B in Table 4 confirm our 
conjectures. Groups with more participants having a connection with the evaluated NGO tend 
to give higher scores; whereas groups with more senior-age members give unfavorable 
assessments – significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  
We believe the instruments are exogenous to the accuracy of the financial report given 
to a third party for three reasons. First, there is no reason why demographics of the community, 
like age, could affect the tendency of an NGO to report accurately and responsibly to a third 
party. The demographics could affect how transparent the NGO is towards the village, but 
hardly with a third party (here the enumerator). Second, as explained in Section 2, the focus 
group selection can be considered exogenous to the concerned NGO. The community leader 
selected the participants without knowing the NGO that was to be evaluated. It was therefore 
not possible for the leader to choose a focus group that would give a biased evaluation of a 
specific NGO. Indeed, Table A3 shows the instruments do not exhibit any significant 
correlations with observable characteristics of the NGO working in the community. The 
balanced tests show that no characteristics of the NGOs are predictive of the composition of 
the focus group, suggesting the characteristics are as good as random.  Third, even if the leader 
failed to unbiasedly form the focus groups, the NGOs would not possibly self-select into 
villages by using the demographic statistics used as our instruments. Unlike other community 
characteristics relating to infrastructure and prosperity or the presence of other public services 
(see Barr and Fafchamps 2006 for Uganda; Fruttero and Gauri 2005 for Bangladesh), our 
instruments are unlikely to be a priority in location choice of these Ugandan NGOs. Panel B in 
Table 4 provides Hansen J statistics and Anderson-Rubin Wald test for the null hypothesis that 
the orthogonality conditions are valid. In both tests, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
our instruments can be excluded from the main equation.  
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Panel A in Table 4 reports the results using the Cragg’s and Heckman model with 
endogenous regressors and the proposed instruments for 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 (see Online Appendix 
C for our computational procedures). Both Cragg-Donald (4.485) and Kleibergen-Paap (8.920) 
statistics are higher than the usual threshold 4, suggesting our instrumentation being 
informative. To account for the low first-stage F-statistics, we additionally report Anderson-
Rubin confidence intervals in Table 4. The confidence interval is [0.6, 60], further supporting 
the significantly positive relationship between community-evaluated performance and 
reporting accuracy in Panel A. The implication is that we can rule out the confounding effect 
of any unobserved motivations that might drive the positive link between better performance 
in serving the communities and the accuracy of NGO financial information.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
6.2 Robust to alternative measures of reporting accuracy 
We show that the positive relationship between performance and reporting accuracy is not 
driven by the method of measuring the deviations from Benford’s Law. Appendix B presents 
three other “critical-value” based proxies used in the Benford’ Law literature, namely the Cho-
Gaines’ (2007) d-statistics, the Kolmogorov – Smirnov (KS) statistics, and the KS test for fit 
of distributions. Although these methods require different choices of critical values, which is 
prone to subjectivity, they offer ease of use and practical interpretations (Barabesi et al. 2018). 
Table A2 reports the qualitatively unchanged results for the alternative measures.  
6.3 Robustness to the functional form and distributional assumptions of the error terms 
Since Heckman and Cragg's estimates rely on the assumptions of normality and 
heteroscedasticity in the main equation error terms, we report three tests of normality and 
heteroscedasticity. Figure A1 in Appendix C reports a clear graphical resemblance between the 
predicted residual density and the normal distribution. In Table 2, Jaque-Bera test statistics 
strongly supports residual normality, while we barely fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
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homoscedasticity at 5%. In the Online Appendix D, we demonstrate the robustness of the 
positive mapping between the community-based evaluation and reporting accuracy. In brief, 
we first estimate two simple nonparametric kernel regressions (local polynomial smooth and 
lowess smother) for a bivariate relationship between performance and reporting accuracy. The 
nonparametric estimators relax the functional form assumptions in the main analysis. Second, 
we perform a Robinson (1988) semiparametric estimator for the sample selection model and a 
Powell (1984) censored least absolute deviations (CLAD) for the censored Tobit model. The 
estimators are robust to heteroscedasticity, consistent, and asymptotically normal for a wide 
class of error distributions. All of the estimations point toward a significantly positive 
relationship between the two variables, assuring us that our results are not sensitive to the 
distributional and functional-form assumptions made under the Heckman and Cragg's model.  
7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we demonstrate the feasibility and usefulness of Benford’s Law to study 
irregularities in financial accounts of a representative sample of NGOs in Uganda. We find that 
25% of the sample provided financial information that did not conform to the Benford 
distribution, suggesting cases of irregularities that a regulatory body would be advised to 
investigate. Our method allows for a cost-effective and replicable measure to monitor financial 
records and identify corruption. Like any measure of financial manipulation, our method is 
neither definitive nor completely fool-proof. Nevertheless, we believe the method is a practical 
approach to flagging potential misreporting by organizations that could subsequently be 
targeted for auditing. As suggested by psychology studies, any creative manipulation to 
preserve the Benford distribution is highly unlikely, especially in the development NGO 
context when the use of Benford’s law is not well-known.   
We also find that the underlying mechanism for nondisclosure of financial accounts 
and the provision of inaccurate information to be uncorrelated. There is evidence that the 
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shortage of skills and resources contributed to non-disclosure of Ugandan NGOs. Given the 
fiscal constraints of government-funded regulators in developing countries, it may be necessary 
to mobilize the donor community to contribute towards funding such oversight mechanisms. 
This funding mobilization could help harmonize the accountability pressure on organizations 
with limited-resources, especially when under-staffed NGOs are unable to accommodate both 
community services and expensive bookkeeping procedures. As it becomes more difficult for 
NGOs that fail to provide credible financial reports to receive funding in the future, the limited 
resources devoted to accountability tasks could lead to a vicious cycle within the NGO field. 
Over time, oligopolization of the NGO sector could become a serious problem where donors 
could move away from under-staffed organizations due to concerns over their financial 
transparency.18  Designing specific financial packages to support poorly resourced NGOs with 
their bookkeeping activities could be a first step to improve the accountability of the sector and 
still maintain the benefits that come with grassroots organizations.  
The analysis also shows that higher community satisfaction scores are aligned with 
accurate reporting, challenging the widely held belief that upward and downward 
accountability are in conflict. Given the alignment and the increased emphasis on community 
responsiveness and community assessments, this work provides support for the prioritization 
of independent community-based feedback and assessment sessions over the emphasis on 
onerous and frequent financial reporting expected in different donor reporting templates. 
Instead of increasing reporting requirements, which typically requires scarce resources diverted 
away from the organization’s main charitable activities, we provide evidence that collecting 
assessments from the beneficiary communities may be more efficient. We also find a strong 
correlation between excessive reporting requirements and lower levels of accuracy. The 
                                                 
18 We thank an anonymous referee for their excellent input on this point.  
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implication is that when a reasonable reporting burden is exceeded, cynicism may erode the 
commitment to accurate and transparent reporting of organizations with limited resources. 
Although our study may suffer from small sample bias, the results are robust across a 
range of modelling approaches: potential endogeneity or relaxing distributional and functional 
form assumptions. Given the importance of transparency for good governance in the NGO 
sector and the lack of data and evidence in the literature, further research is vital. Data 
availability remains an important constraint and limits the evidence available on how to best 





A. The Benford’s distribution of first digits of numbers in a naturally occurred dataset 
Hill's (1995) theorem also provides the following formal derivation of the distribution 
according to Benford's Law: 




where P(d) is the probability that digits 𝑑 = 1, 2, … , 9 occurs as the leading digit in a 
naturally drawn set of numbers. Table A1 records the full theoretical distribution specified by 
Benford’s Law. 
[Insert Table A1 here] 
B. Robustness to alternative measures of conformity to Benford’s Law 
We complement the main analysis with three “critical-value based” measures created from: (1) 
the Cho-Gaines’ (2007) d-statistics (D), (2) the Kolmogorov – Smirnov (KS) statistics, and (3) 
a binary variable of whether we fail to reject the null hypothesis of the data conforming to the 
Benford distribution using the two-sample Kolmogorov – Smirnov test at the significance of 
10% (Conform = 1 if Yes, 0 otherwise):  




























where 𝑁 is the total number of non-zero financial items used, 𝑃𝑜(𝑑𝑖) and 𝑃𝑒(𝑑𝑖) are 
respectively the frequency of digit 𝑑𝑖 appearing in the observed sample and the expected 
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) is the critical value of the two-sample 
Kolmogorov – Smirnov test at 𝑁 and test power 𝛼 = 0.10 (for which 𝑐(𝛼) = 1.22). For the 
Cho-Gaines’ (2007) d-statistics, we use 5 instead of 1 to construct the measures based on Cho-
Gaines’ d-statistics since the statistics are larger than 1 (see Morrow, 2014 for the critical 
values). The number 5 is arbitrarily chosen to facilitate the computation of the Cragg model and 
varying its magnitude does not change the results. We also transform the usual KS statistics 
(that measures the divergence of the two samples) into the formula above to measure the 
convergence of the two samples. Like the measure from the MAD statistic, lower values of the 
indices indicate that the tested data diverge further from the Benford distribution. Table A2 
show similar results for the main equation. 
[Insert Table A2 here] 
C. Additional Figures 
[Insert Figure A1 here] 
[Insert Table A3 here] 
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 Table 1. Descriptive statistics of Ugandan NGOs 
VARIABLES 
Full Incomplete Complete 
Mean S.D Mean Deviate Conform 
      
Measure of accuracy 0.71 0.423 0 0.942 0.964 
Performance  4.202 1.037 4.407 3.842 4.224 
Reports requested per year 1.288 2.639 0.815 2.105 1.241 
% Professional degrees 0.350 0.304 0.282 0.407 0.363 
Government as a hindrance 0.413 0.495 0.556 0.368 0.362 
Registered as company 0.606 0.491 0.630 0.526 0.621 
Received grant 0.673 0.471 0.481 0.579 0.793 
Lack of skilled staff 0.529 0.502 0.481 0.579 0.534 
Lack of funding 0.731 0.446 0.778 0.632 0.741 
Years working in government 5.875 0.495 5.963 7.842 5.190 
Tenure length 6.481 8.286 5.667 7.605 6.492 
Clerical staff 3.894 4.702 2.111 4.105 4.655 
NGO Age of existence 10.442 6.399 11.074 11.000 9.966 
Religious Affiliation 0.356 9.700 0.185 0.526 0.379 
Board 0.894 0.481 0.926 0.789 0.914 
Member involvement 0.404 0.309 0.333 0.474 0.414 
% of group aged > 55 0.094 0.138 0.115 0.079 0.089 
% of group with connection to NGO 0.346 0.338 0.398 0.283 0.343 
Observation 104 27 19 58 
Notes: Statistics are means unless otherwise stated. Binary variables take the value of 1 if 
yes and 0 otherwise. Incomplete represents 27 NGOs who only provide either revenues or 
expenses related information or none. Complete represents 77 NGOs who provide all 
revenue and expenses related financial figures as requested. Categorization of conformity is 
based on the two-sample Kolmogorov – Smirnov test between the observed distribution and 
the theoretical distribution (see Appendix B for details). Source: Authors’ analysis based on 
the 2002 Ugandan NGO survey data. 
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Outcome equation: Ri 
Heckit Cragg's 
    
Performance (community satisfaction) 51.851 3.384*** 3.459** 
 (165.804) (1.282) (1.648) 
Board  -849.361** 4.272 3.750 
 (406.894) (4.430) (4.642) 
Registered as company 136.415 9.316*** 9.419*** 
 (370.485) (2.701) (2.675) 
Received grant (Yes = 1) 808.361*** -0.740 -0.092 
 (226.026) (3.869) (3.218) 
NGO Age 139.149*** 1.093 1.181*** 
 (51.613) (0.681) (0.381) 
NGO Age2 -4.573*** -0.033* -0.035*** 
 (1.134) (0.020) (0.010) 
Tenure length -90.388* -0.075 -0.112 
 (51.517) (0.336) (0.186) 
% Professional degrees 1,287.665** -1.015 0.197 
 (598.840) (6.155) (2.903) 
Clerical staff (log) 75.902* 0.019 0.036 
 (41.018) (0.205) (0.143) 
Reports requested per year 48.942 -0.923* -0.846** 
 (78.927) (0.557) (0.404) 
Religious affiliation 1,574.535*** -4.757 -4.062 
 (334.990) (3.818) (2.540) 
Lack of skilled staff 231.249 -1.997 -1.732 
 (336.440) (2.794) (2.644) 
Lack of funding -503.696 2.564 2.351 
 (369.878) (2.937) (2.385) 
Government as a hindrance -739.811** -2.261 -2.760 
 (298.481) (3.249) (3.329) 
Years working in government 2.964 -0.462**   -0.444* 
 (16.210) (0.174) (0.231) 
Member involvement 762.451**   
 (367.103)   
Number of non-zeros  0.543*** 0.549*** 
  (0.103) (0.076) 
Lambda/sigma  -2.522 10.357*** 
  (8.924) (0.647) 
Constant -221.743 912.200*** 909.986*** 
 (733.631) (10.870) (9.545) 
Observations 104 104 104 
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Clustered standard errors at district level (14) in 
parentheses. Selection equation estimation uses logit. Coefficients in the selection equation are 
multiplied by 1000 for easier interpretation. Jaque-Bera test statistics of residual normality in the 
outcome equation: Pr(Skewness) = 0.142, Pr(Kurtosis) = 0.3699, Joint-test chi-square statistic 
(p-value) = 3.03 (0.22). Breusch-Pagan heteroscedasticity statistics (p-value) = 3.91 (0.05). 
Variable Performance is the evaluation from the community focus group. Section 5.2 provides 
a description of the controls.  
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Table 3. Model selection tests 
The HPC test for the preferred model (Silva, Tenreyro, and Windmeijer 2015) 
Null Hypothesis (Ho) Heckman model is valid Cragg model is valid 
t-statistics 3.054*** -3.064 
Probability > t (p-values) 0.001 0.999 
Vuong’s (1989) test for non-nested models 
Null Hypothesis (Ho) The respective distances to the unknown “true” model are equal 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1) Cragg’s specification is closer 
Ln Ration (s.e) [p-value] 6.753 (0.394) [0.000] 
Observations 104 104 104 104 
Note. Both tests unanimously indicate the double-hurdle censoring mechanism fits the data 





Table 4. IV estimations of the selection and outcome equations 




Outcome equation: Ri 
IV-Heckit IV-Cragg 
    
Performance (community satisfaction) 271.502 10.92** 11.289** 
 (377.653) (5 .114) (5.154) 




Lambda/sigma  15.209 10.089*** 
  (11.054) (0.634) 
Observations 100 100 100 




% of group aged > 55 -1.635 ***  (0.585) 
% of group with connection to the NGO 0.792 **   (0.406) 
  
Sanderson-Windmeijer F test of excluded instruments: (Prob > F) 4.49***   (0.016) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics (weak identification)      4.485 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (under-identification) (p-value) 8.920 **   (0.012) 
Hansen J statistics (overidentification) (p-value) 0.596       (0.440) 
Anderson-Rubin Wald weak-instrument-robust test: (Prob>F) 2.48        (0.095) 
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Clustered standard errors at district level (14) in 
parentheses unless stated otherwise (bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications are 
largely identical). The coefficient 𝜃2 of the predicted value of the suspected endogenous variable 
(𝑣) = -9.212 * (5.160), indicating the presence of endogeneity. Anderson-Rubin coverage-
corrected confidence interval and p-value are based on approximations. The null hypothesis of 
Anderson-Rubin Wald weak-instrument-robust inference is that coefficients of instruments are 
insignificant in the structural equation and the orthogonality conditions are valid. The test is 
robust to potential weak instrumentation. The null hypothesis of Sanderson-Windmeijer’s (2016) 
F-test statistics is that the instruments can be excluded from the first-stage estimation. The null 
hypothesis of Cragg-Donald (1993) Wald test statistics is that the instruments are weakly 
identified when compared against Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value with the maximal 
LIML size of tolerance bias at 20% (4.42). Rejection of these null hypotheses suggests the 
absence of a weak instrumentation problem. The over-identification and under-identification 







Table A1. Probability predicted by Benford’s Law for the leading digits 
𝑑 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 





Table A2. Estimations of outcome equations for alternative measures of reporting accuracy 
VARIABLES 
d-statistics KS statistics Conform 
Heckit Cragg Heckit Cragg Heckit 
      
Performance  1.020*** 1.010** 12.534** 11.606* 92.360* 
 (0.334) (0.497) (5.601) (5.972) (47.541) 
Board 0.910 0.980 33.099* 39.582 146.372 
 (1.153) (1.293) (19.335) (25.962) (164.118) 
Registered as company 2.699*** 2.685*** 20.812* 19.531* 131.501 
 (0.703) (0.723) (11.741) (11.847) (99.671) 
Received grant (Yes = 1) -0.301 -0.388 28.745* 20.693 287.253** 
 (1.008) (0.816) (16.663) (15.351) (141.492) 
Age 0.353** 0.341*** 4.481 3.391** 39.959 
 (0.177) (0.109) (2.949) (1.358) (25.035) 
Age2 -0.011** -0.010*** -0.166* -0.131*** -1.414* 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.086) (0.032) (0.729) 
Tenure length -0.012 -0.007 -1.842 -1.388 -18.429 
 (0.087) (0.054) (1.475) (1.183) (12.520) 
% Professional degrees -0.181 -0.343 -3.847 -18.893 145.409 
 (1.604) (0.807) (26.526) (16.889) (225.240) 
Clerical staff 0.012 0.009 -0.209 -0.419 1.847 
 (0.053) (0.044) (0.901) (0.732) (7.650) 
Reports requested per an.  -0.150 -0.161 -3.960 -4.917** -20.833 
 (0.145) (0.100) (2.432) (1.912) (20.643) 
Religious Affiliation -0.704 -0.797 3.322 -5.320 -65.545 
 (0.994) (0.741) (16.698) (11.529) (141.723) 
Lack of skilled staff -0.322 -0.358 4.244 0.950 -44.901 
 (0.728) (0.680) (12.112) (13.060) (102.829) 
Lack of funding 0.589 0.618 5.824 8.473 54.232 
 (0.764) (0.607) (12.815) (9.443) (108.775) 
Government as a hindrance -0.743 -0.676 -29.967** -23.760 -115.436 
 (0.846) (0.725) (14.059) (19.908) (119.363) 
Years working in government -0.113** -0.110* -1.159 -0.911 -11.653* 
 (0.045) (0.061) (0.759) (0.873) (6.440) 
Number of non-zeros 0.049* 0.048*** 1.567*** 1.497*** 5.724 
 (0.027) (0.016) (0.429) (0.299) (3.646) 
Constant 30.319*** 30.67*** 701.5*** 729.0*** -31.146 
 (2.833) (2.177) (46.806) (40.521) 39.745 
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Clustered standard errors at district level (14) in 
parentheses. The selection equation is identical as in Table 1. We omit the results the double-





Table A3.  A balance test for correlations between NGO characteristic and instruments  
VARIABLES IV-connection IV-senior 
Reports requested per year 0.001 -0.005 
 (-1.161) (-0.452) 
% Professional degree 21.123** -0.015 
 (-9.38) (-3.724) 
Registered as company -9.88* 0.000 
 (-5.852) (-2.353) 
Received grant -0.093 -6.47*** 
 (-6.112) (-2.33) 
Lack of skilled staff -0.110 0.001 
 (-6.682) (-2.633) 
Lack of funding 0.014 -0.031 
 (-5.834) (-2.244) 
Government as a hindrance -0.050 0.002 
 (-5.944) (-2.35) 
Years working in government -0.001 0.002 
 (-0.385) (-0.148) 
Tenure -0.006 -0.002 
 (-0.604) (-0.236) 
Clerical staff 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.011) (-4.18E-03) 
Age -0.003 0.000 
 (-0.00256) (-0.001) 
Religious Affiliation -12.043* -0.012 
 (-6.161) (-0.0243) 
Board 0.013 0.046 
 (-9.363) (-3.65) 
Member involvement 0.072 0.001 
  (-5.89) (-2.314) 
Note. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. Coefficients reported from separate linear 
regressions, where each characteristic is regressed on the respective instrument by OLS. 
There are generally no insignificant associations between NGO characteristics and each 
instrument. We show here that the instruments do not exhibit any strong significant 
correlations with observable characteristics of the NGO working in the community. All 





Table A4. A sample of Financial Information Requested in the 2002 survey.  
All amounts in thousands of shillings 
2001 or preceding 
fiscal year  
2000 or preceding 
fiscal year  
REVENUES 
  
A. Recurrent revenue  ,000  ,000  
Grant from: International NGO           Disbursed ,000  ,000  
                                                     Authorized ,000  ,000  
                     Ugandan NGO             Disbursed ,000  ,000  
                                                     Authorized ,000 ,000 
                    National government      Disbursed ,000  ,000  
                                                     Authorized ,000 ,000 
                     Local government         Disbursed ,000 ,000 
                                                      Authorized ,000 ,000 
                     UN organization           Disbursed ,000 ,000 
                                                      Authorized ,000 ,000 
Membership fees ,000 ,000 
Fees paid by recipients of services rendered by 
[NGO] 
,000 ,000 
Income from services rendered to the government ,000 ,000 
Income from services rendered to another 
NGO/CBO  
,000 ,000 
Income from services rendered to another 
NGO/CBO 
,000 ,000 
Profit on special events (e.g., fair, concert, paying 
dinner) 
,000 ,000 
Voluntary donations from members ,000 ,000 
Voluntary donations from Non-members ,000 ,000 
Property income/endowment income ,000 ,000 
Tax refunds ,000 ,000 
Other: specify ,000 ,000 
B. Divestment ,000 ,000 
Sale of land or buildings ,000 ,000 
Sale of vehicles ,000 ,000 
Sale of equipment or machinery (including 
computers)  
,000 ,000 
   
Total revenues  ,000 ,000 
EXPENDITURES 
  
A. Recurrent expenditures  
  
Program costs (what goes to the community: drugs, school 
books, etc)  
,000  ,000  
Wages/salaries/honorarium or full package  ,000  ,000  
Housing allowances  ,000  ,000  
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Transport allowances  ,000  ,000  
Subsistence allowances and per diems to [NGO] staff and 
volunteers  
,000 ,000 
Subsistence allowances and per diems to [NGO] 
beneficiaries  
,000 ,000 
Utilities (electricity, water, etc.)  ,000 ,000 
Petrol/fuel  ,000 ,000 
Rent for land and buildings  ,000 ,000 
Payment to NGOs/CBOs for services rendered  ,000 ,000 
Payment to someone else for services rendered  ,000 ,000 
Grants/voluntary donation/contribution to another 
NGO/CBO/Church  
,000 ,000 
Interest on debt and financial charges (including 
leasing)  
,000 ,000 
Bribes  ,000 ,000 
Other costs  ,000 ,000 
B. Investments  ,000 ,000 
Land and buildings  ,000 ,000 
Vehicles  ,000 ,000 
Equipment and machinery (including computers)  ,000 ,000 
Total annual expenditures  ,000 ,000 
BORROWING SITUATION 
  
Loans/borrowed money from: ,000 ,000 
Ugandan/International NGO     Borrowed ,000 ,000 
                                            Remaining  ,000 ,000 
Local/national Government       Borrowed ,000 ,000 
                                            Remaining ,000 ,000 
UN agency/Bilateral donor        Borrowed ,000 ,000 
                                            Remaining ,000 ,000 
Bank/financial institution          Borrowed ,000 ,000 
                                            Remaining  ,000 ,000 
OTHER FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
  
Amount of Investment financed by hire-purchase ,000 ,000 
Values of equipment ,000 ,000 
Values of inventories ,000 ,000 
Values of vehicles  ,000 ,000 
Note: 1 US dollar = 1806.15 Ugandan Shillings in July 31 2002. All of these financial items 
are used to conduct our indices using Benford’s Law. There are 60 pieces of financial 
information (financial items) requested for each NGO in each year. Ideally, we would be able 
to collect 120 financial items over two years to construct measures of information accuracy 






There is no legend for Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
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Figure 1. The Ugandan NGO financial data and conformity to Benford’s Law 
 
Note. Lines represent the theoretical frequency of digits 1 to 9 appearing as the first digits 
according to Benford’s Law. Bars represent the observed distributions in the three samples. 
Capped spikes represent confidence intervals at the 10% level of significance. Panel A presents 
the distributions for all the numbers in all financial accounts provided by the NGOs. Panel B 
is a representative NGO (25% of the sample) whose requested financial accounts fail the 
hypothesis test of conformity to the law using the two-sample Kolmogorov – Smirnov test. 
Panel C is a representative NGO (75% of the sample) where we fail to reject the hypothesis 
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Figure 2. Flowchart illustrates steps of our analysis 
 
Note. A possible Case 3 is that incomplete information is due to the lack of authorization or the 
enumerator effect. We address this concern with the survey design and checking with 




Figure 3. Descriptive relation between the degree of report accuracy and NGO performance 
 
Note. OLS regression using the full sample from the matched 2002 Ugandan NGO survey and 
corresponding community data. Measure of report accuracy is the MAD calculated using 
Benford’s Law for NGOs with complete disclosure, Evaluated Performance is from the 




Figure A1. Density plot of predicted residuals from OLS estimation of the main equation 
 
Note. Estimated kernel density is also plotted. A clear resemblance between the kernel density 
and the normal distribution suggests the normality condition in residual terms is graphically 
valid. 
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Evidence from investigating Ugandan NGO financial accounts 
by 
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*************************************** 
A. Conceptualizing the mechanisms of information disclosure and accuracy 
We model the decisions made by an (imperfectly) altruistic NGO i on whether to provide all 
requested information and then their report’s accuracy level to a third party. The model 
complements the conceptual framework in Section 4. There are two main results. First, an NGO 
may provide incomplete information because: (i) the NGO strategically withholds information 
even when all information is available; and (ii) the NGO chooses ex ante to record only some 
necessary information, hence unrecorded data is simply due to the data having never been 
collected. We further show that the higher the ex-ante cost of gathering information, the lower 
the accuracy of sequential reports submitted by the organization. This proposition is consistent 
with the finding that costly accounting procedures could harm the monitoring process as the 
organization now faces a higher trade-off between upward accountability and downward 
accountability. Once the organization’s preference is to mainly focus on the utility of their 
beneficiaries rather than accountability (either due to their antagonistic attitude or the donors 
being lenient toward accountability), incomplete disclosure remains an option.  
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The NGO decides by solving the following maximization problem:19  
max
𝑃𝑖,𝑅𝑖
𝑈𝑖(𝑃𝑖, 𝑅𝑖)  𝑠. 𝑡 𝐸𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑅𝑖 + 𝜏𝐶(. ) (OA.1) 
where 𝑈𝑖 is a (possibly individual-specific) well-behaved, continuous and twice 
differentiable utility function on its domains 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖  ∈ ℝ≥0 indicating the outcome of their 
altruistic projects (e.g. feedback scores from their beneficiary community) and the degree of 
report accuracy (for example, among 100 reported items, how many are recorded accurately), 
respectively.20 The term 𝐸𝑖 ∈ ℝ>0 designates the positive, fixed resources of the NGO 
(including non-monetary effort of the manager). The NGO decides to spend on delivering 
altruistic projects and determining the degree of report accuracy. As discussed above, we 
implicitly assume that the NGO can choose the extent of its reporting accuracy. This is not 
unreasonable because an NGO can either exert more resources to record detailed transactions 
and avoid human errors (increased diligence) or simply have increased integrity. For 
tractability, we simply assume that the outcome of their altruistic projects and reporting with a 
degree of 𝑅𝑖 > 0 require the same numeric amount 𝑅𝑖 of resources. If the NGO spends 𝑅𝑖 = 0, 
we have 𝐶(. ) = 0 or incomplete disclosure. Reporting with a degree of 𝑅𝑖 further incurs a fixed 
cost of information acquisition 𝜏𝐶(. ). The parameter 𝜏 > 0 reflects the increasing cost of 
information gathering (e.g. hiring at least a clerk to manage book-keeping). We denote 𝐶𝑖(. ) 
as an indicator function such that 𝐶𝑖(. ) = 1 if NGO i provides a complete set of the requested 
                                                 
19 The illustration is inspired by the selection mechanism in (Bettin, Lucchetti, and Zazzaro 
2012) on remittances. 
20 Another way to interpret the degree of report accuracy is the probability of the report being 
found accurate by an objective test. We capture this interpretation by using the p-values of Chi-
square and Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of whether the reports follow Benford’s Law as 
measures of report accuracy.  
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information (complete disclosure), and 𝐶𝑖(. ) = 0 if either expenditure-related or revenue-
related information or both are missing (incomplete disclosure). In the case of incomplete 
disclosure, we treat NGO i as exerting no resources in reporting or 𝑅𝑖 = 0 if 𝐶𝑖(. ) = 0. 
Otherwise, 𝐶𝑖(. ) = 1 if 𝑅𝑖 > 0. 21 The parameter 𝜏 > 0 represents the fixed cost of disclosing 
full information, which includes either costs of information acquisition or ex post costs 
discussed above. 
To reflect the altruistic aspect, we further assume: 
 𝑈𝑖(0, 𝑅𝑖) = 0 and 𝑈𝑖(𝑃𝑖, 0) > 0 and 𝑈𝑖(𝑃𝑖, . ) is a strictly quasi-concave function of 𝑃𝑖. 
This set ensures that the altruistic NGO derives no utility from diverting all the given 
resources away from delivering core projects and they always gain from completely 
focusing on altruistic activities. The last assumption is to imply the NGO’s preference on 





> 0,  𝑈𝑃𝑃




≥ 0,  𝑈𝑅𝑅
𝑖 > 0. This set ensures that increased 
performance measure and reporting accuracy provide increasing marginal utility. Note that 
by 𝑈𝑅
𝑖 ≥ 0, we also implicitly assume that some NGOs may gain zero additional utility 
from increased accuracy.  
                                                 
21 We rule out cheap talk by implicitly assuming that a full disclosure carries some extent of 
true information. 
22 Formally, let 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 denote two performance measure values of a set 𝑋 and 𝑦 ≽ 𝑥, then 
for every 𝑡 ∈ (0,1): 𝑡𝑦 + (1 − 𝑡)𝑥 ≽ 𝑥. That is, if 𝑦 is preferred over 𝑥, then any mix of the 
two is still preferred than 𝑥.  
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Proposition 1.  If 𝜏 > 0, there always exists a unique solution (𝑃𝑖, 𝑅𝑖) ∈ ℝ≥0 to (1).
23 
Furthermore, the NGO may choose incomplete disclosure, 𝐶𝑖(. ) = 0, in two situations that 
correspond to the explanations in Section 4.1: 
i. Either when 𝑈𝑅
𝑖 = 0 or when the non-zero optimal report accuracy the NGO plans to have 
is feasible but so low such that the utility of incomplete disclosure outweighs the potential 
optimal utility. Formally, there exists a reservation level of accuracy 𝑅 > 0 that for all 0 <
𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑅: 𝑈𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑟𝑖) < 𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑖, 0). Incomplete disclosure is preferred since 𝑅𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝑅. 
ii. If the fixed cost of disclosure 𝜏 is sufficiently high that a non-negative accuracy is not 
feasible. 
Proof. If UR
i = 0, the utility function is constructed such that the NGO’s preference 
does not attach any additional utility to either increased accuracy or complete disclosure. The 
problem has a unique solution (𝐸𝑖, 0).
24 In this case, the construction of 𝑈𝑅
𝑖  governs both 
mechanisms underlying disclosure and accuracy decisions.  
If UR
i > 0, we can solve the two following auxiliary problems by Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker conditions:  
max
𝑃𝑖
𝑈𝑖(𝑃𝑖, 𝐸𝑖 − 𝜏 − 𝑃𝑖)   𝑠. 𝑡        𝐸𝑖 − 𝜏 ≥ 𝑃𝑖 ≥ 0 (OA.2) 
max
𝑃𝑖
𝑈𝑖(𝑃𝑖 , 𝐸𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖)         𝑠. 𝑡        𝐸𝑖 ≥ 𝑃𝑖 ≥ 0                                            (OA.3) 
                                                 
23 The proposition does not hold if 𝜏 < 0. For example, let 𝐸𝑖 = 1 and 𝜏 = −1 and 𝑈𝑖(𝑃𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖) =
4𝑃𝑖
2 + 𝑅𝑖
2 + 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑅𝑖. As the function defining the constraint set is discontinuous at (2,0), the 
maximisation problem has no solution.  
24 Another situation by construction is when 𝑈𝑖(. , . ) is convex on its domains, or 𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑅𝑅 −
𝑈𝑃𝑅
2 ≥ 0. In that case, (𝐸𝑖, 0) maximises the original problem as 𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑖 − 𝜏, 0) < 𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑖, 0) by 
𝑈𝑃 > 0. 
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Let x1 and x2 be the respective solutions of (OA.2) and (OA.3), u1 and u2 be the 
respective values of the maximized utility. Denote 𝐺(𝑃𝑖) = 𝐸𝑖 − 𝜏𝐶(. ) − 𝑃𝑖 the constraint set 
of the main problem. As 𝜏 > 0, {𝑃𝑖: 𝐺(𝑃𝑖) ≥ 0, 𝑥 ≥ 0} is non-empty and compact. According 
to Wierstrass Theorem, since 𝑈𝑖(𝑃𝑖 , . ) is continuous on 𝑃𝑖, there exist 𝑃1 = 𝑥1 and 𝑃2 = 𝑥2 that 
solve (OA.2) and (OA.3 respectively.   
We now show x1 and x2 are unique. For x1, suppose there exists two maxima 𝑥1 ≠
𝑥1
′  𝑠. 𝑡 𝑈𝑖(𝑥1, . ) = 𝑈𝑖(𝑥2, . ), 𝐺(𝑥1) ≥ 0, 𝐺(𝑥1
′) ≥ 0. For 𝑡 ∈ (0,1): 
𝐺(𝑡𝑥1 + (1 − 𝑡)𝑥1
′) = 𝑡𝐺(𝑥1) + (1 − 𝑡)𝐺(𝑥1
′) ≥ 0 (OA.4) 
Thus, tx1 + (1 − t)x1
′  is a feasible point. Since UR
i > 0 and Ui(Pi, . ) is strictly quasi-
concave on 𝑃𝑖, we have that: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑡𝑥1 + (1 − 𝑡)𝑥1
′ , . ) > min{𝑈𝑖(𝑥1, . ), 𝑈𝑖(𝑥2, . )} = 𝑢1 (OA.5) 
This is a contradiction as u1 is assumed the maximised value, or x1 is unique. A similar 
rationale applies for x2. 
To specify the solutions for the original problem we compare 𝑢1 with 𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑖, 0), that 
is when the NGO exerts no resources on reporting. If 𝑢1 > 𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑖, 0) and 𝐸𝑖 − 𝜏 > 𝑥1, 𝑥1 solves 
the original solution. In other words, the NGO discloses and chooses some non-negative level 
of inaccuracy at optimum (since 𝑅1 = 𝐸𝑖 − 𝜏 − 𝑥1 > 0). Otherwise, we have two situations 
that lead to a solution of incomplete disclosure.  
First, if u1 = max
𝐸𝑖−𝜏>𝑃𝑖≥0
𝑈𝑖(𝑃𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖) < 𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑖, 0), the solution to the main problem must 
be either (𝑃𝑖, 0) or (𝑥2, 0) depending on which utility between 𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑖, 0) and 𝑢2 is larger. Notice 
that since max
𝐸𝑖−𝜏>𝑃𝑖≥0
𝑈𝑖(𝑃𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖) < 𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑖, 0), 𝜏 > 0 and 𝑈𝑅
𝑖 > 0, we have 
lim
𝑅𝑖→0
𝑈𝑖(𝑃𝑖, 𝑅𝑖) <𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑖, 0). Thus, there exists a reservation level of report accuracy 𝑅 > 0 such 
that for all 0 < 𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑅: 𝑈𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑟𝑖) < 𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑖, 0). Combining with 𝑢1 = max
𝐸𝑖−𝜏>𝑃𝑖≥0
𝑈𝑖(𝑃𝑖, 𝑅𝑖) <
𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑖, 0), we interpret this as the optimal report accuracy that the NGO plans to have is so low 
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that the utility of incomplete disclosure outweighs the potential optimal utility. Either way, 
incomplete disclosure is the solution.  
Second, if 𝑢1 > 𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑖, 0) but 𝐸𝑖 − 𝜏 < 𝑥1, hence (𝑥𝑖, 𝑅𝑖
∗) is not feasible. Again, the 
solution to the main problem must be corner and be either (𝑃𝑖, 0) or (𝑥2, 0) depending on the 
relative value of 𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑖, 0) and 𝑢2. The underlying mechanism for the corner solution is 
however due to the maximised value of 𝑢1 so that a feasible 𝑅𝑖
∗ is unattainable (in this case, it 
must be negative). The intuition is that as the fixed cost 𝜏 is set too high that 𝐸𝑖 − 𝜏 < 𝑥1 for 
NGO i, the optimal report accuracy must have been negative for the NGO. The NGO 
maximizes utility by choosing Ri = 0. QED 
If we further assume that Uτ < 0, that is the NGO is worse off when the fixed cost of 
information gathering increases (e.g. they are left with fewer resources for charitable activities). 
We have the following Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2. If Ri





≤ 0. That is, as the fixed cost of disclosure increases, the optimal choice of accuracy 
decreases. 
Proof.  We formally show that Ri
∗ exists in the proof of Proposition 1. Given the existence, if 
incomplete disclosure occurs, R∗ = 0, the lemma is bounded.  
If complete disclosure occurs, consider the main maximization problem with respect 
to Pi over [0, Ei − τi]. Under the (bounded) lattice constraint, rewrite the maximisation in terms 
Ri: max
0≤Pi≤Ei−τ
Ui(Ei − τ − Ri, Ri).  
Since we only have one choice variable, super-modularity is trivial. As the constraint 
set is a bounded lattice, we will only need to check increasing differences in (Ri
∗, −τ = ϑ). 







> 0 since Uτ < 0. 




< 0. QED.  
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B. Vuong’s (1989) non-nested hypothesis test 
As both Heckman and Cragg models are non-nested, we use a Vuong (1989) test to compare 
the difference in their respective Kullback-Leibler information criterion (KLIC) distance from 
the unknown “true” model that best fits the data. The distance is defined as follows:  
𝐾𝐿𝐼𝐶 ≡ 𝐸(𝐿𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) − 𝐸(𝐿∗) (OA.6) 
where 𝐿𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 is the log of the conditional density of the unknown true model and 𝐿∗ is 
the log of the conditional density of the model approximating the data. Vuong (1989) suggests 
that to minimize KLIC is equivalent to maximizing the expected log-likelihood 𝐸(𝐿∗) and 









  (OA.7) 
where 𝐿𝑛 represents the log-likelihood of the Cragg and Heckman models, ?̂?𝑛, 𝜃𝑛 are 
respectively the regressors in the main equation of the two models. ?̂?𝑛
2 is the estimated variance 
























where 𝑓(?̂?𝑛) and 𝑓(𝜃𝑛) are the individual log-likelihoods of the Cragg and Heckman 
models. The likelihood statistic 𝑧 is tested against the standard normal distribution. A positive 
𝑧 suggests that Cragg's model is closer to the unknown true model. Otherwise the Heckman 
model is preferred. Figure OA1 illustrates the three categories. 
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Figure OA1. Three types of NGOs regarding information disclosure and report accuracy
 
Source. Adapted from Bettin et al.’s (2012) example on remittance behaviors. 
C. Cragg’s and Heckman model with endogenous regressors 
Let 𝑍𝑖 be a set of instrument variables, the two equations of interest with the endogenous 
explanatory variable, 𝑥, are written as:  
𝑅𝑖
∗ = 𝛼1 + γ𝑥 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽1 + 𝑢𝑖 
 
(OA.9) 
                           𝐶𝑖(. ) = 𝛼2 ++𝑆𝑖
′𝛽2 + 𝑣𝑖 (OA.10) 
Some studies have addressed the simultaneity problems of heterogeneity and 
selectivity (see Wooldridge, 2010). Blundell and Smith (1994) and Newey (1987) provide the 
general framework for a control function approach to estimate sample selection and double-
hurdle models with endogenous covariates. For some applications, Semykina and Wooldridge 
(2010) and Schwiebert (2015) develop Heckman selection models with endogenous 
explanatory variables. Although we acknowledge our small sample size, we adopt Semykia 
and Wooldridge's (2010) procedure for the IV-Heckman as follows: first estimate a Probit for 
the selection indicator on instruments Zi and other exogenous variables using all observations: 
Ci(. ) = Zi
′γ1 + Si
′α1 + u1i. Obtain the estimated inverse Mills ratios: λ̂i2. Second, estimate the 
adjusted main equation Ri
∗ = X1i
′ β2 + βIV−Heckmanx + θ1λ̂i2 + vi2 by LIML using instruments 
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(Zi, λ̂i2) using the selected sample of NGOs who fully disclose. We use LIML instead of 2SLS 
to improve the efficiency and to avoid potential severe biasedness of 2SLS with weak 
instruments in small sample size. The standard errors are clustered at district level and 
bootstrapped with 100 replications.  
Other studies address endogeneity issues in Tobit-type models. Smith and Blundell 
(1986) and Rivers and Vuong (1988) discuss asymptotically efficient two-step maximum 
likelihood estimators and provide estimation procedures for Tobit and bivariate probit models. 
Although the procedures are not designed specifically for double-hurdle models, Blundell and 
Smith (1994) suggest that their approach – discussed in Smith and Blundell (1986) – can be 
extended to a double-hurdle model by using the appropriate maximum likelihood function 
specified in Cragg (1971). Another advantage of the Smith-Blundell procedure is it does not 
require any distributional assumptions for the first stage estimation. For these results, we adopt 
Blundell-Smith procedure by MLE as our IV-Cragg estimator (Wooldridge 2010 p. 682): first, 
estimate the reduced form of 𝑥 on instruments 𝑍𝑖 and other exogenous variables by OLS: 𝑥 =
𝑍𝑖
′𝛾2 + 𝑆𝑖
′𝛼2 + 𝑢2𝑖. Obtain estimated parameters of the OLS residuals of 𝑥 as: 𝑣 = 𝑥 − 𝑍𝑖
′𝛾2 +
𝑆𝑖
′?̂?2. Second, estimate a standard Cragg’s double-hurdle model with the main equation as: 
 𝑅𝑖
∗ = 𝑋1𝑖
′ 𝛽3 + 𝛽IV−Cragg𝑥 + 𝜃2𝑣 + 𝑣2𝑖. The estimates are consistent, and the standard errors 
are clustered at district level and bootstrapped with 100 replications.  
The estimates 𝛽IV−Heckman and 𝛽IV−Cragg from Equation (9) and (12) are the 
parameters of interest. To test for the presence of endogeneity in 𝑥, we use standard t-test on 
?̂?𝑖2 and 𝑣. That is, if we reject either of the null hypotheses 𝐻𝑜: 𝜃1 = 0 or 𝐻𝑜: 𝜃2 = 0, we also 
reject the null hypothesis that 𝑥 can be treated as exogenous in our specification, equivalent to 
the Hausman test in an ordinary IV linear model. To assess the possibility of weak instruments 
we report several statistics: (i) the Sanderson-Windmeijer F-test of excluded instruments, 
computed in the first-stage estimation via OLS; (ii) the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics against 
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the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value of tolerance bias at 10% (15%, 20%) maximal LIML 
size; (iii) the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test statistics for 𝐻𝑜: the specification is underidentified; 
(iv) Anderson-Rubin Wald weak-instrument-robust inference test for coefficients of 
instruments being insignificant in the structural equation; and (v) Hansen J statistic test for 
overidentification. We note that these statistics are not technically equivalent for nonlinear 
models and only provide informative indications (see Sanderson and Windmeijer 2016).  
D.  Robinson (1988) and Powell (1984) semi-parametric and non-parametric estimators 
We estimate two simple nonparametric kernel regressions (local polynomial smooth and 
lowess smother) in Figure OA2 for a bivariate relationship between performance and reporting 
accuracy.25 The nonparametric becomes complex when adding more variables into a kernel 
regression because it introduces locally sparse noises (“curse of dimensionality”).26 We 
propose two exercises to rectify. First, we repeat the above nonparametric kernel regressions 
between the accuracy measure (y) and residuals (u) from an OLS of (y) on all control variables 
except the evaluated performance (x). The intuition is that the residuals (u) can capture 
variations in the accuracy measure (y) that are probably due to the excluded variable (x), but 
not the control variables. A positive relationship between (u) and (y) indicates a positive 
relationship between the excluded (x) and (y). Both panels in Figure OA3 support the result.  
Second, we perform a Robinson (1988) semiparametric estimator for the sample 
selection model and Powell (1984) censored least absolute deviations (CLAD) for the censored 
Tobit model (see Online Appendix D). The estimators are robust to heteroscedasticity, 
                                                 
25 The lowess smoother accounts for the values of the evaluated performance variable locating 
mainly to the right spectrum: only a few NGOs were rated least satisfied. 
26 Das, Newey, and Vella (2003) develop theoretical nonparametric estimators that also allow 
for endogeneity. Newey and Powell (2003) propose a two-step nonparametric method which 
avoids the strong exogeneity assumptions. Blundell and Powell (2004) provides a review on 
nonparametric and semiparametric models dealing with endogeneity. 
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consistent, and asymptotically normal for a wide class of error distributions. Figure A4 reports 
Robinson (1988) estimations for scenarios when 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 is considered exogenous and 
endogenous. Using Powell’s (1984) estimator, we obtain the estimate for 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 of 
5.381 with a bootstrapped and clustered standard error of 3.318. The bias-corrected confidence 
interval is [4.616, 16.517]. The estimation shows a significantly positive relationship between 
the two variables, assuring us that the results are not sensitive to the distributional and 
functional-form assumptions made under the Heckman and Cragg's model.  
To illustrate Robinson’s (1988) estimator we rewrite the selection model as follows: 
Ri = m(xi) + Xi
′β + λ(Si) + εi (OA.11) 
where xi is the evaluated performance variable which enters the equation as the 
nonparametric component 𝑚(. ), ruling out the functional dependence with 𝑅𝑖. 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑆𝑖 are 
the parametric components of the equation, consisting of other covariates for the outcome and 
selection equation. 𝜆(𝑆𝑖) is the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the selection regression. The 
double residual estimator of Robinson (1988) is obtained by:  
𝑅𝑖 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖|𝑥𝑖]⏟        
𝑢1
= (𝑋𝑖 − 𝐸[𝑋𝑖|𝑥𝑖])
′𝛽 + 𝜆(𝑆𝑖) − 𝐸[𝜆(𝑆𝑖)|𝑥𝑖] + 𝜀𝑖




To avoid imposing any functional form, the estimator replaces the unknown quantities 
E[𝑅𝑖|𝑥𝑖], 𝐸[𝑋𝑖|𝑆𝑖] and 𝐸[𝜆(𝑆𝑖)|𝑥𝑖] by a smooth unknown function estimated by nonparametric 
(kernel-weighted) estimators. The error term 𝜀𝑖 can be non-normal and assumed exogenous 
𝐸[𝑥𝑖|𝜀𝑖] = 0.  Robinson (1988) shows it is possible to construct root-n consistent and 
asymptotically-normal estimates from the residuals 𝑢1, 𝑢2 obtained from these nonparametric 
estimators as: 𝛾 = (?̂?2
′ ?̂?2)
−1?̂?2
′ ?̂?1. The parameter of interest for 𝑥𝑖 can be extracted from 𝛾 
without modelling explicitly 𝑚(𝑥). To obtain the ordinary inverse Mills ratio, Robinson (1988) 
shows that if 𝜆(𝑆𝑖) is estimated parametrically (probit), the asymptotic distribution of the 
estimates is affected unless ?̂?(𝑆𝑖) estimated by the nonparametric estimation converges to the 
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estimate from the parametric estimation. To improve the efficiency, we bootstrap at 50 
replications of the clustered error terms to account for the possibility that ?̂?(𝑆𝑖) does not 







−1, where 𝜃𝑗 = ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑖, ?̂?𝑖 is the residual for the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ observation 
and 𝑡𝑖 is the row vector of 𝑇𝑖; 𝑛𝑐 = 14 is the number of clusters (districts). We also experiment 
with different trimming levels incrementally from 0.00 to 0.05. Since the results are similar, 
we report the default level 0.00. 
The general framework of Robinson (1988) allows an extension to account for 
potential endogeneity of 𝑥𝑖 or 𝐸[𝑥𝑖|𝜀𝑖] ≠ 0. Assume there exists a vector of exogenous 
instruments 𝑍𝑖 such that 𝑍𝑖 is correlated to 𝑥𝑖 but not to 𝜀𝑖: 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑍𝑖
′𝜋 + 𝑣𝑖 and 𝐸(𝑍𝑖|𝜀) = 0. 
Assume that 𝐸(𝜀𝑖|𝑥, 𝑣) = 𝜌𝜏 or 𝜀𝑖 = 𝜌𝜏 + 𝜂. The selection model becomes: 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝑚(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜆(𝑆𝑖) + 𝜌𝜏𝑖 + 𝜂 (OA.13) 
The partially linear model can be estimated by conditioning on xi: 
𝑅𝑖 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖|𝑥𝑖]⏟        
𝑢1
= (𝑋𝑖 − 𝐸[𝑋𝑖|𝑥𝑖])
′𝛽 + 𝜆(𝑆𝑖) − 𝐸[𝜆(𝑆𝑖)|𝑥𝑖] + +𝜌(𝑣




Here, different from the unknown E[Ri|xi], E[Xi|Si] and 𝐸[𝜆(𝑆𝑖)|𝑥𝑖], 𝐸(𝑣|𝑥𝑖) can be 
parametrically estimated from the residuals of the first stage of IV 𝑣 = 𝑥 − 𝑍′?̂?. To account 
for the residuals being estimated, we bootstrap the clustered error terms at 50 replications.  
For a semiparametric censored Tobit model of 𝑅𝑖 = max{0, 𝑋𝑖
′𝛼 + 𝜀}, Powell (1984) 
proposes estimation of the unknown parameters 𝛼 by the minimiser ?̂?𝐶𝐿𝐴𝐷 (censored least 
absolute deviations): 









Buchinsky (1994) provides an iterative linear programming algorithm (IPLA) to 
computationally estimate the parameters.  
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Figure OA2. Kernel-weighted regressions of report accuracy (y) and NGO performance (x) 
 
Note. Panel A reports a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression (multiple piecewise linear 
estimations locally in a neighborhood of x within a given bandwidth). Polynomials of x are 
included to improve the fit of the estimation. The default Kernel (Epanechikov) distribution 
and 95% confidence interval bands are used. The direction of the relationship remains similar 
given reasonable changes of our chosen bandwidth (𝑁−0.5 = 0.4). Panel B plots the locally 
weighted scatter plot smoothing, which allows evaluation points near extrema to be 









Figure OA3. Kernel-weighted regressions of accuracy measure and performance (residuals) 
 
Note.: We repeat the nonparametric kernel regressions between the accuracy measure (y) 














Figure OA4.  Semiparametric non-IV and IV estimation following Robison (1988) model 
 
Note. See Online Appendix D for details. IV estimation uses for instruments proposed in 
Section 6.3. Both Panels exhibit a positive relationship between the measure of reporting 
























E. The geography of the surveyed NGOs in 2002 
Map OA.1. Districts in the 2002 Ugandan NGO survey.  
 













F. Additional Tables 




Outcome equation: Ri 
IV-Heckit IV-Cragg 
    
Reports requested per year 37.765 -0.455 -0.586 
 (104.395) (0.674) (0.376) 
% Professional degrees 1,604.467** 8.659 0.112 
 (723.274) (7.205) (3.241) 
Registered as company 56.767 12.245*** 10.638*** 
 (388.568) (3.077) (2.374) 
Received grant (Yes = 1) 982.209** 6.593 1.734 
 (423.353) (5.443) (4.049) 
Lack of funding -719.620 -0.994 0.679 
 (521.026) (3.709) (2.423) 
Lack of skilled staff 236.746 -0.068 -0.743 
 (402.950) (3.935) (3.045) 
Government as a hindrance -843.225** -9.860* -7.042 
 (403.710) (5.530) (4.626) 
Years working in government 0.313 -0.533** -0.414* 
 (22.731) (0.222) (0.224) 
Tenure length -135.144** -0.697 -0.333* 
 (62.618) (0.546) (0.195) 
Clerical staff 95.982 0.231 -0.024 
 (60.820) (0.259) (0.117) 
Age 208.572* 2.900** 1.502*** 
 (107.683) (1.140) (0.384) 
Age2 -6.471** -0.088*** -0.043*** 
 (3.045) (0.033) (0.010) 
Religious Affiliation 1,712.166*** 0.885 -3.013 
 (536.460) (5.019) (3.213) 
Board -1,114.106 -2.749 0.659 
 (704.692) (6.502) (4.930) 
Member involvement 704.594*   
 (401.664)   
Lambda/sigma  15.209 0.516*** 
  (11.054) (0.083) 
Constant -845.115 877.391*** 10.042*** 
 (1,154.951) (21.426) (0.679) 
Constant -845.115 877.391*** 899.071*** 
 (1,154.951) (21.426) (13.051) 
Observations 100 75 100 
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Clustered standard errors at district level (14) in 
parentheses (bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications are largely identical). The set 
of instrumental variables is not statistically significant in the selection equation. The 
coefficient 𝜃2 of the predicted value of the suspected endogenous variable (𝑣) = -5.962* 
(3.104), indicating the presence of endogeneity.  
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G. Robustness to different measures of satisfaction  
In the main analysis, the focus group of 6 to 10 participants were asked to rate their satisfaction 
with the NGO performance by answering the question “the people who live in this parish are 
satisfied with the performance of [NGO]” on a Likert scale (1 = least satisfied and 5 = most 
satisfied).  In addition, the focus group questionnaire included several other relevant aspects 
such as: how good the NGO is at what they do (NGO_good); how important the NGO is to 
the community (NGO_important); how accessible the NGO is to the community 
(NGO_assessible), and how quickly the NGO responds when the community asks for help 
(NGO_quick_respond). For completeness we report: in Table OA2 the correlations of our 
preferred measure and the four alternative measures; and in Table OA3 robustness checks 
using these measures. We note that the alternative measures are positively correlated with our 
preferred measure and the estimates are generally positive, despite showing less precision. 
Using other aspects of satisfaction does not alter out main results.  
 
Table OA2. Correlations of alternative measures of satisfaction 
 Satisfaction with the NGO performance 
(1 = least satisfied, 5 = most satisfied) 
NGO_good: the NGO representatives are good  
at what they do 
0.58 
NGO_important: the NGO is an important part  
of the community 
0.57 
NGO_assessibe: the NGO representatives are  
always available when they say they are going to be 
0.05 
NGO_quick_respond: The NGO is always quick to respond 
whenasked for help 
0.56 














Performance 3.384*** 3.459** 2.916 
 (1.282) (1.648) (1.846) 
NGO_good 3.177* 3.252* 3.067 
 (1.779) (1.744) (2.125) 
NGO_important 1.944 2.008 1.488 
 (1.246) (1.230) (1.327) 
NGO_assessible 1.514* 1.523* 1.610* 
 (0.832) (0.839) (0.856) 
NGO_quick_respond 1.887* 1.995* 1.555 
 (1.123) (1.095) (1.183) 
Note. Performance is used in the main analysis, measured as the rating of the beneficiary 
community on how the people of the parish are satisfied with the general performance of the 
NGO (1 = Least, 5 = Most). The modified MAD statistics measure the conformity of the 
reported data with Benford’s Law. A larger value indicates a larger deviation from the 
theoretical Benford distribution. The naïve OLS regression uses the sample with available 
information on reporting accuracy without correcting for any sample selection; robust standard 
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